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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Brief Background
China was a member of the victorious alliance, but scored few actual gains
in the First World War. It was also a country deeply immersed in one of
the main battlefields of the Second World War. Thus, China received great
impact from the two World Wars, which was reflected on its circumstances at
the time. Externally, it was faced with the imperatives of “national salvation”
(jiuguo) (Schwarcz 1985), so that protecting its sovereignty and independence
was China’s top priority. Internally, it was experiencing difficult revolutionary
changes and a transition from a traditional country to a modern one.
Meanwhile, the public started to get involved in diplomacy, so-called “cit-
izen diplomacy”. Although its precise meaning differed, according to the
changes in the national situation, citizen diplomacy was a manifestation of
democratization of diplomacy. It can be defined as ordinary citizens super-
vising, supporting and affecting their own government’s foreign policies and
diplomatic activities by means of public opinion and mass movements, so as to
achieve the public’s aspirations and demands for the interests of the country.
Both when it comes to modernization and citizen diplomacy in the first
half of 20th century, China experienced significant changes, especially during
the period from the 1920s to the 1940s, owing to the two World Wars.
21.2 Research Question
According to the modernization school, there exists a division of firstcomers
and latecomers due to the way in which societies are involved in this process
(Black 1966, Eisenstadt 1966, Levy 1972, Sanderson, 1995). For instance, Eng-
land, France and North America represent firstcomers where the challenge of
modernity emerged from below and within. By contrast, Japan and China be-
long to the latecomers, because their modernization was stimulated externally,
taking the firstcomers as models. From the experience of most firstcomers
and Japan, it seems that democratization of diplomacy was a comme-il-faut
consequence of modernization of the society. Therefore, this thesis is devoted
to answering two research questions:
1. What was the relationship between China’s modernization and the changes
in citizen diplomacy from the 1920s to the 1940s? In Chapter Four, I find
that China’s modernization progressed while citizen diplomacy declined
during the period. A negative relationship is suggested.
2. Why was the relationship between China’s modernization and the changes
in citizen diplomacy in this period negative?
This thesis examines the correlation between modernization and democra-
tization of diplomacy, and seeks to explain the negative relationship found in
China.
1.3 Literature Review
In terms of studying China’s modernization, both Western and Chinese
scholars have produced a great deal of literature. Rozman (1981) portrays
China’s modernization from the 18th century to the 20th century, going through
the imperial dynasties, the Republic era and the rule under the Chinese Com-
munist Party (CCP). He adopts an analysis model by which five aspects of
3modernization are considered: international context, political structure, eco-
nomic structure and growth, social integration, and knowledge and education.
Similarly, Spence (1990) also makes a significant contribution to the topic
within the same time spam, but he much emphasizes the most obvious fea-
ture of every period, such as “fragmentation and reform”, “envisioning state
and society” and “war and revolution”. The volume edited by Xu and Chen
(1996) present Chinese scholars’ research on China’s modernization from 1800
to 1949, which is organized in the form of special projects. Wasserstrom (2003)
approaches this period in the Chinese history from perspectives that have been
ignored before, such as newspaper analysis and gender studies.
Besides such overall studies of China’s search for modernity, some scholars
focus on specific parts. Lieberthal (1995) traces political reforms and revolu-
tions from imperial China to the People’s Republic of China (PRC). Nathan
(1997) focuses on China’s transition in terms of democracy and institution
building. In contrast to these efforts on central power, Rankin (1986, 1993)
highlights the local administration and the rise of public sphere and civil soci-
ety. Inglehart and Welzel (2005) summarizes the emancipative effect of socio-
economic developments on the redistribution of resources. Regarding the awak-
ening of the Chinese public, Fitzgerald (1996) analyzes how China struggled
for political liberation by revolutions respectively led by the Nationalists and
the Communists in a socio-cultural frame. The May Fourth Movement1 is of
crucial importance in intellectual revolutions. Zhou (1967) maps the whole
process of the movement and gives in-depth comparative studies of different
interpretations of main intellectual currents. Schwarcz (1985) accesses this is-
sue from the perspective of enlightenment and the tension between national
1The May Fourth Movement was an anti-imperialist, cultural, and political movement
growing out of student demonstrations in Beijing on May 4, 1919 protesting the Chinese
government’s weak response to the Treaty of Versailles, especially the Shandong Problem.
These demonstrations sparked national protests and marked the upsurge of Chinese nation-
alism, a shift towards political mobilization and away from cultural activities, and a move
towards populist base rather than intellectual elites. The broader use of the term “May
Fourth Movement” often refers to the period during 1915-1921 more usefully called the New
Culture Movement (Zhou 1967).
4salvation and social enlightenment. More specifically, she (1978) also accounts
how the Chinese intellectuals, as the leadership of enlightenment and the New
Culture Movement, grew into the Chinese intelligentsia. Furth (1976) con-
tributes to presenting different researches on the Nativism, which was one of
the currents that shaped Chinese (conservative) thinking in the beginning of
the 20th century. However, debates also took place inside the Chinese intel-
ligentsia. Luo (1990) collects amount of primary documents written by the
Chinese intelligentsia in the 1920s-1940s. To illustrate this debate concerning
the clash of Western values of modernity and traditional thoughts, Tong (1993)
and Zhang (1999) discuss conflicts between Confucianism and modernity.
Another important element involved in China’s modernization from the
1920s to the 1940s was the rise and rivalry of the CCP against the KMT
(Guomingdang). Eastman (1984) claimed that the struggle between the two
parties and the failure of the KMT were rooted in the weak centralization
of the Nationalist government. Van de Ven (1991) further explains how the
two parties experienced collaborations and breaking up twice. Pertaining to
the outbreak of the civil war, both external situations and internal factors are
studied by Westad (1993, 2003).
In contrast to the enormous literature on China’s modernization, citizen
diplomacy is a newly developed topic. Nowadays, researches on China’s cit-
izen diplomacy during the first half of the 20th Century have progressively
emerged but still not sufficiently developed. It also needs to be mentioned
that citizen diplomacy in most Western literature, as the equivalent of “track
two” diplomacy (Sharp 2001), is different from the citizen diplomacy in the
Chinese context. The resources of studying China’s citizen diplomacy in the
first half of the 20th century mainly rely on Chinese scholars’ researches. How-
ever, most of the current literature on citizen diplomacy is still in the form of
degree dissertations and journal articles, which may be categorized into four
main strands:
The first strand concerns the meaning of citizen diplomacy, such as indexing
the development of the concept (Liu 1995, Ren 2006), comparing the definition
with other kinds of diplomacy (Zhou 2008), and focusing on the practice and
5organizations in different regions (Guo 2005).
The second strand is dedicated to the analysis of the relationship between
governmental diplomacy and citizen diplomacy, such as (1) the dynamic rela-
tions between diplomats, the public and the diplomacy (Ma 2005), and (2) the
legitimacy of citizen diplomacy (Xiong 2007).
The third strand of literature relates citizen diplomacy to China’s gover-
nance during specific years, like the Beiyang government and the Warlord era
(1916-1928) (Yin 2004).
Finally, the fourth strand relates citizen diplomacy to China’s conduct in
a specific international conference, i.e. such as the Paris Peace Conference, or
the Washington Peace Conference (Deng 2007).
Although the literature mentioned above quotes a lot of primary documents
of the intellectual advocacy and contribution to the diffusion of citizen diplo-
macy among the public, there are three shortcomings of existing literatures:
1. Most of the literature is historical studies, and merely covers citizen diplo-
macy during the early Republic era. Only Yin outlines citizen diplomacy
after the 1930s. Nevertheless, she does not go further into this period.
2. Citizen diplomacy is more treated as a static phenomenon than as a
“process”. Few efforts are made to see how citizen diplomacy developed
in the course of China’s social transition in the 19th and the 20th century.
3. Analysis by the Chinese literature is expressed in normative statements
and from the perspective of communist interpretation, which failed to
hold relatively objective perspectives. For instance, definitions given by
Deng, Xiong and Guo regard the nature of citizen diplomacy as an anti-
imperialist and anti-feudal movement.
Apart from these problems with the existing literature on citizen diplo-
macy, attempts to relate citizen diplomacy to China’s modernization is al-
most completely absent. Thus, there are two improvements could be made
in this thesis. First, rather than historical studies, it is worthwhile to adopt
a perspective from political science. For instance, relate citizen diplomacy to
a framework based on the theories of modernization and democratization of
6diplomacy. Second, despite the difficulties in accessing Chinese documents,
combining Western and Chinese literature is valuable to complement the re-
search on the topic. This thesis aims at fulfilling the two points on the basis
of former researches.
1.4 Research Design
One should always be careful when using Western concepts such as “mod-
ernization” and “democratization” in relation to China. Admittedly, the pro-
cess of China’s transition shared some characteristics with the West2, but there
were also particularities that call for attention and researches.
To make these terms explicit and apply them to study modern China,
Cohen (1985) notes the importance of “context” and the “conceptualization”
of indigenous and endogenous sources of historical movements. Adcock and
Collier (2001: 529-546) suggest two methods concerning this issue of contex-
tual specificity. One is contextualization – formulating a systematized con-
cept through reasoning about the background concept, in light of the goals
of research. The other is operationalization – on the basis of a systematized
concept, develop one or more indicators for scoring or classifying cases. Both
methods help apply terms appropriately. In other words, defining terms in the
context and consistently adopting indicators of evaluation are two fundamental
instruments to eliminate or at least reduce potential threats toward validity as
differences exist in context.
Therefore, at first, both methods will be applied to introduce the two main
variables in this thesis: (1) China’s modernization. The definition of mod-
2In this thesis, the West refers to an essentialized conceptual category used by Chinese
intellectuals rather than an objective unified entity. In reality, the industrial systems of
Western nations, while sharing basic traits of liberal capitalism, also differed significantly.
The various experiences of developments of Western industrialized countries thus cannot be
collapsed into one monolithic model. Most Chinese intellectuals, in fact, perceived Japan
as having successfully adopted Western-style economic and military modernization. For
this reason, their discourse on China’s modernity and nationalism continued to rely on an
essentialized notion of the “West” (Zanasi, 2004: 143-144).
7ernization in China will be based on how the course was initiated. Then, I
will adopt Rozman’s analytical model to describe five main areas of China’s
modernization in the first half of the 20th century. (2) Citizen diplomacy. The
contextual connotation of China’s citizen diplomacy will be examined firstly.
Then I take a closer look at three characteristics of citizen diplomacy: the
change of leadership, interactions with the government, and the improvement
of main instruments.
After introducing the two main variables of this thesis, I will answer the
first research question: what was the relatinship between China’s modern-
ization and the changes in citizen diplomacy from the 1920s to the 1940s.
I use three criteria to look at China’s modernization, namely the leadership,
the establishment of constitutional institutions and redistribution of resources.
Regarding citizen diplomacy, I consider three aspects: the main task, its rela-
tionship with governmental diplomacy, and the main instruments. Also, cases
of the Paris Peace Conference and the Washington Peace Conference will be
studied to support the arguments. Therefore, I find that China’s modern-
ization obtained certain progress while citizen diplomacy declined during the
period. A negative relationship is concluded.
Finally, I try to explain the negative relationship between China’s mod-
ernization and the changes in citizen diplomacy, to answer the second re-
search question. Huang (1991) points out the problems of employing unspo-
ken assumptions that ignore the obvious differences between the West and
China. For example, “commercialization must usher in capitalist and modern
development”, and ‘employing the concept of “civil society” to characterize
social-political changes under the reforms development’. I will start to clar-
ify the correlation between modernization and democratization of diplomacy
first. Then, an analysis model will be formulated to explore the conditions
of forming a positive relationship between modernization and democratization
of diplomacy, referring to Black’s theory of “four phases of modernization”.
Then I use this model to analyze to what extent China fulfilled or failed to
fulfill these conditions, and thus to explain the negative relationship between
China’s modernization and the changes in citizen diplomacy from the 1920s to
8the 1940s.
1.5 Plan
The thesis is organized as follows:
Chapter Two provides an overview of China’s modernization during the
Republic era, which began at the end of the Qing dynasty (1911) and ter-
minated when the PRC was established (1949) in Chinese history. Also the
term “modernization” is contextualized here, in order to avoid disputes of the
meaning of this concept, and to produce appropriate indicators for the analysis
in Chapter Four.
In Chapter Three, I look at the concept of citizen diplomacy in the context
provided in the previous chapter. To clarify the meanings of citizen diplomacy,
I compare it to other similar conceptions, such as “track two” diplomacy and
public diplomacy.
Chapter Four demonstrates the negative relationship between China’s mod-
ernization and the changes in citizen diplomacy. I offer a diagnosis of China’s
social conditions, in particular the changes that happened in China’s situation
in the two decades (1920s and 1940s). Then, using case studies of the Paris
Peace Conference and the Washington Peace Conference, I consider how mod-
ernization progressed, compared with the decline of citizen diplomacy during
the periods.
Chapter Five aims at explaining why such a negative relationship existed.
An analytical model that contributes to discovering the conditions influential
to the relationship of the two variables will be built, so as to account for the
Chinese case in a historical context.
Finally, the Conclusion summarizes the whole thesis and lists main findings.
Chapter 2
The Process of China’s
Modernization
This thesis considers the Republic era beginning at the end of the Qing
dynasty (1911) and terminating when the People’s Republic of China was es-
tablished (1949). Due to the two World Wars and China’s civil war, this
was a period that suffered instability and fragmentation. Nonetheless, it also
witnessed China’s modernization through political revolution, increased pros-
perity of national industries and social enlightenment in the Chinese society.
This chapter provides an overview of this period in Chinese history.
This chapter is divided into two parts to portray China’s modernization.
Section 2.1 will first provide a definition of modernization that fits into the
specifically Chinese context, and then will present the four stages of China’s
groping for modernization from the mid-19th century to the beginning of the
20th century. Section 2.2 will, by adopting Rozman’s analytical model, articu-
late five main areas of China’s modernization during the first half of the 20th
century respectively.
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2.1 An Contextual Definition of “Moderniza-
tion”
In order to avoid disputes of the meaning of concepts and to produce ap-
propriate indicators for cases, conceptualization and operationalization of the-
oretical concepts merit some attention. When studying China’s modernization
during the first half of the 20th century, providing a definition of modernization
that fits into this context is essential.
2.1.1 Modernization: Firstcomers and Latecomers
According to the modernization school, modernization is thus a multi-
faceted process by which societies are transformed under the impact of the
scientific and technological revolution, signaling a stage of cognition in which
it is believed that human control over nature increases. It implies a dichoto-
mous distinction between “modernity” vs. “tradition”, and more importantly,
a tendency of societies to converge (Sun 2008). In the words of S. N. Eisen-
stadt (1966), “historically speaking, modernization is a process of transition
toward Euro-American social, economic and political systems”3. This asser-
tion indicated the spectacular difference among modernizing societies. The
firstcomers are countries such as England, France and North America – soci-
eties for which transformation was primarily intrigued by indigenous factors
such as culture and values, and experienced over a long period. In contrast,
the latecomers that relied more heavily on borrowing from foreign models and
on rapidly adding to or replacing existing structures, for instance, Russia and
Japan (Levy 1972).
China belongs to the latter category. For modernization of a latecomer
to be successful, there are two ways of responding to the challenges from the
3According to this view, all modernized societies share the following characteristics: an
industrial market economy, sustainable economic growth, an extensive bureaucracy, a high
rate of literacy, popularization of formal education, reduction of overall inequality, increasing
social mobility, a relatively low birth-rate, urbanization, decreasing influence of religion, an
adaptable social structure, and a modern value system.
11
model countries – either borrowing without undermining, or creating internal
conditions conducive to modernization. Japan, for instance, was successfully
modernized in a relatively short time by adopting a highly centralized political
regime. It created a solution that drew support from the Japanese loyalty to
their emperor - the “Tenno system”, which enhanced coordination and control
in the course of modernization. Nevertheless, these two options generated
diverse attitudes among the intellectuals towards the West in modern China,
rather than tangible outcomes. Debates concerning to what extent China
should be “westernized” had been initiated since the 19th century, which will
be further illustrated in section 2.2.5.
Admittedly, the process of China’s modernization shared characteristics
with the West, but there were also particularities. He (2002) argues that the
normative content of the project of modernity is centered on universalism,
which affirms the moral unity of the human species and accords secondary im-
portance to specific historical associations and cultural forms. China’s unique-
ness was mainly among notable cultural ideas, and associated with the percep-
tion of the inalterability of China’s cultural norms. These were the legacy of
China’s long history, but also were “internal barriers embedded in the societies
that impede development (Sun, 2008: 89). The implementation and content
of China’s modernization remained conservatively Chinese in spite of the great
impact exerted by the foreign experience.
2.1.2 Four Stages of China’s Groping for Modernization
Since the mid 19th century, China had been strongly impressed with the
advanced technology and strong military strength of the West, the firstcomers
of modernization. Invading wars, exploitation of resources and unequal treaty
system were endowed upon China by the Great Powers. Externally, it lost the
position as an influential empire that it used to have; internally, during the late
period of the Qing dynasty, China’s intellectuals commenced their searching
for the way of national revitalization, which in fact started China’s groping for
modernization. This process can be broadly divided into four stages:
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STRATEGY. The Opium War (1839-1942) and the Treaty of Nanjing
started the “opening of China”. Chinese worldview of self-centrality needed ad-
justment as China was faced with Western gunboats. The intellectuals started
reviewing the new position of China in the world on the strategic level. For
instance, Wei yuan, an outstanding reformer and patriotism thinker at that
time, raised slogans such as “learning the advanced technology from foreigners
in order to deal with the foreigners” and “open eyes to look around the world”
(Leonard 1984).
TECHNOLOGY: The advanced technology signaled the power of the West-
ern countries. Moreover, as the Kingdom of Heavenly Peace born out of an
1850 uprising known as the Taiping Rebellion, the Qing government was com-
pelled to make compromise with foreign forces in order to import technology
and industry to repress the uprising. The temporarily harmonious complexion
served a pretty good outer environment to the springing-up of the Yangwu
Movement in 1860. Its English translation used to be Westernization Move-
ment, but this translation did not share the same connotation and denotation
with “yangwu”. “Yangwu” was related to Western technology and industry.
The movement was dedicated to national self-strengthening in this field. China
built the first state-owned factory in 1863 and developed more bureaucratic
institutions that aimed at developing technology and industry.
POLITICAL REFORM. In the late 19th and early 20th century, external
intervention wars and unequal treaties signed after the loss of wars had been
placing severe threats to the existence of the country. After the failure of the
Boxer Rebellion and the “Xinchou Treaty” signed by the Qing government in
1901 with the Great Powers, a series of attempts at political reforms started
- the 1895 Joint Petition of Imperial Examination Candidates to the Emperor
(gongche shangshu), the Reform Movement of 1898 (wuxu bianfa) and the
Hundred Days Reform in 1898 (bairi weixin). Although such top-down po-
litical reform did not work in China at the time, but it did pave the way for
large-scale transition in the Chinese society after the 1911 Revolution.
CULTURAL AND SOCIAL ENLIGHTENMENT. Based on the former
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stages, a public sphere4 was preliminarily created in the Chinese society at the
beginning of the 20th century (Rankin 1993). The cultural and social strand of
modernization was reached in the process of public enlightenment. In 1915, in
the face of Japanese encroachment on China, young intellectuals, inspired by
“New Youth” (Xin Qingnian), a monthly magazine edited by the iconoclastic
intellectual Chen Duxiu, began agitating for the reform and strengthening of
the Chinese society. As part of this New Culture Movement, they attacked
traditional Confucian ideas and exalted Western ideas, particularly science and
democracy.
2.2 Mapping China’s Modernization in the First
Half of the 20th Century
To present the overall picture of the process, Rozman’s (1981) analytical
model containing five main areas is adopted here. It has to be mentioned that
these areas are not isolated from each other. For instance, in economically
advanced areas, a rapid and permanent expansion of elite-managed, quasi-
governmental local activities was reinforced by the growth of other public and
private activities as a result of foreign trade (Rankin 1986: 3).
2.2.1 International Context
During the half-century period before 1949, foreign factors shaped the
course of China’s modernization in two different ways. On the one hand,
modernized countries were considered comprehensive resources of means of
modernization as already mentioned. China’s opening to the West, although
it was enforced by unfair treaties and mainly served for commercial trade,
4Rowe (1993) suggests the existence in the Qing and Republican eras of something related
but not identical to the civil society, which call the “public sphere”. This concept firstly refers
to a variety of emerging “public utilities” and “public services” outside direct state control,
and later further appropriated to legitimate a “critical” public sphere of extrabureaucratic
political debate.
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benefited the public with the import of modern ideas. On the other hand, in-
creasing contact with foreign countries brought about threats toward China’s
national survival (Xu and Chen 1996). National salvation remained essential
and fundamental to the process, which resulted in the popular perception of
a hostile international environment. Rozman (1981: 444) portrayed an evolu-
tional picture of Chinese popular mood towards the outside world:
“In the 1910s the onerous foreign presence corroded the idealism
and naivet of the 1900s. The Japanese Twenty-One Demands and
the Versailles peace treaty in particular worsened the perception of
modernized countries. Images of rapacious neighbours and dishonest
governments in China were strengthened. In the 1920s, the period in
which Chinese unity was least threatened by new acts of imperialism,
the mood was more strongly anti-imperialist than ever; there was
more indignation with less cause. And in the 1930s and the first half
of the 1940s, the preoccupation with Japanese aggression nurtured
the psychology of endangerment from abroad. This new world view
created a national consensus and a feeling of participation, a sense
of urgency in all activities.”
This kind of double-edged influence exerted by international context fea-
tured other internal aspects of China’s modernization. China met the challenge
of modernity externally, but “borrowing without coordination” provided de-
bates and conflicts inside the Chinese society. This problem will be further
discussed in Chapter Five.
2.2.2 Political Structure
Following the reform decade of the 1900s and the collapse of the Qing
dynasty, political disintegration persisted for almost half a century. After
the 1911 Revolution, imperial rule for over two thousand years was ended in
China by the establishment of the Republic of China. During the decades
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afterwards, the Republic era went through the Beiyang period5, warlordism,
the Nationalist government, Japanese invasion, and the civil war between the
KMT and the CCP.
Nonetheless, the first formal president of the Republic of China Yuan Shikai
shortly restored the imperial system respectively in 1915 and 1917, which
deeply disappointed the public and aroused strong dissatisfaction with the
Beiyang government. In 1926 the KMT initiated the Northern Expedition
to militarily overthrow the Beiyang government, and commenced the Nanjing
decade on April 18, 1927. Nationalist rule acceded to power on a wave of
popular enthusiasm, but lost the support of virtually every stratum of society in
less than a dozen years later. Meanwhile, the CCP’s advanced from strength to
greater strength (Eastman 1984). But the army of the CCP only outnumbered
that of the Nationalists by mid-1948. Thus, China’s modernization in the first
half of the 20th century received little guidance from the central government or
other stable organizations due to frequent regime changes during the decades.
Despite these struggles for or short success of unification occurred, divisive
regional powers prevailed. Absence of national leadership coexisted with pro-
found changes of local political structure. The conservative gentry was gradu-
ally eliminated as a meaningful social category, but the regional administration
structure dominated by them was not coordinated into central regime. Instead,
new regional and local holders of power emerged, such as modern merchants
and warlords. They replaced the conservative gentry to rule the Chinese rural
society. After the 1920s, this kind of diversity drifted toward unified control
of the CCP.
5The Beiyang period collectively refers to a series of military regimes that ruled from 1912
to 1928 in Beijing. It was internationally recognized as the legitimate government of the
Republic of China in this period. The name came from the Beiyang Army that dominated
China’s politics during this period with the rise of Yuan Shikai and his successors.
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2.2.3 Economic Structure and Growth
Rozman (1981) takes industrial development during the first half of the
20th century as a general phenomenon: “...Under the Ch’ing government6 in
the last years of the nineteenth century, important steps were taken to launch
industrial development. During World War I and over much of the next two
decades, modern industries appeared in Shanghai, in Manchuria, and in cities
elsewhere near the coast and the Yangtze River, where foreign and Chinese
capital, technologies, and managements mingled freely”. He concludes that
“the considerable industrial growth that did occur, even given the absence of
political stability”. Two characteristics of China’s industrialization needs to
be highlighted:
First is the interaction between foreign investment that occupied Chinese
markets since the late 19th century, and the so-called Chinese national capi-
talism. But the “mingling” of the two was not really “free”. The pressure of
foreign commercial competition never eased in China’s market until the out-
break of the First World War. From 1914 to 1920, Chinese light industries such
as textile and flour mills developed rapidly, but this short-lived Golden Age of
prosperity of Chinese industries faded away with the return of the West to the
Chinese market (Zhou 1967: 6-8). Chinese national capitalism only obtained
a breathing space and an opportunity to grow when the West was immersed
in the Great War. This correlation implied that the long-term penetration
of Western capitalism exerted negative impact on the development of Chinese
national capitalism.
Secondly, as Rozman emphasizes, the economic growth “was centered in
coastal and riverine cities linked more closely to each other, and to foreign
places, than to most of the Chinese interior.” But China’s traditional self-
sufficing agricultural and village economy as a whole was quickened to change
after the opening of China by the West.
6Another translation of the Qing Dynasty.
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2.2.4 Social Integration
Due to the unbalanced changes taking place in political and economic
structures, China’s modernization was more presented as an urban experience.
Zanasi (2004: 113) accesses this issue from a relatively unique perspective –
“attempts to define China’s identity and its position among the world powers
led to the creation of two competing tropes. On the one hand, the treaty ports
came to represent a China integrated in the world and pursuing a Western-
style path toward modernization. The rural village, on the other hand, came
to be perceived as the locus of a pristine Chinese identity, uncontaminated by
foreign imperialism”.
“Treaty ports” as Shanghai, which from the 1840s through the 1940s were
subdivided districts containing mixtures of Chinese-run and foreign-run, had
been forced open to foreign trade and settlement by the Opium War. Conse-
quently, those cities became the main places where Western (also Japanese)
ideas, products, and technologies of communication entered China. And within
them, a “public sphere” took shape (Harrison 2003: 83102). This does not
mean that no changes were undergoing in rural areas. In contrast, since
decades before the Second World War, hundreds of local rural reform pro-
grams had appeared in China. But the reforms were mainly to claim general
superiority for rural Chinese life and society. For instance, the representative
of neo-Confucianist, Liang Shuming, also promoted his agrarianism in rural
reconstruction and spoke for rural reform in the 1930s (Alitto 1976: 213-241).
Moreover, destroying the old order outstepped the building of a new one
during this period, especially in the rural areas, which hastened the social
disintegration and widened the gap between the urban and the rural. For
instance, the KMT national government established in 1927 forged a social
infrastructure in the regions it controlled while the rural areas were left almost
untouched, which reinforced the gap between the rural land from the urban
sector. Critical task still remained in involving the village in the urban-led
intensification of modernization.
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2.2.5 Knowledge and Education
In the first decade of the 20th century, two new phenomena appeared in
the field of education. The first one was the abolishment of imperial examina-
tions7 in 1905, and consequently, so was the pre-modern educational system.
However, traditional education and literatures exerted quite long-lasting influ-
ence and invisible power upon the Chinese society, even without the system
it was based on. Secondly, reformers imported a new and western system on
a nationwide scale and sponsored young students to study abroad, expecting
the new education to contribute to the attainment of modernization. This
substitution of educational system was proved poorly aligned with social real-
ities owing to inadequate central direction and overly foreign orientation, but
it prepared the dramatic break with previous modes of intellectual activity in
China. ‘Changing self-perceptions of intellectuals who pioneered new modes of
“eloquence” in the 1910s and went on to transform themselves into an intelli-
gentsia that has functioned as “practical persuader” in the Chinese revolution
from the 1920s onward’ (Schwarcz 1978: 1-18).
Nevertheless, the Chinese intelligentsia was not a unified group. As men-
tioned in section 2.1.1, debates took place between two main camps. One
dedicated to criticizing Western modernity, and exhibited a strong desire to
preserve Chinese cultural characteristics. Furth defines this camp as cultural
conservatism and outlines two styles of it. First, there were the followers of na-
tional essence who were secular-minded and placed value in the ideal of culture
rather than in forms of social custom or political practice. In the 1920s Cai
Yuanpei, the head of Beijing University at the time, spoke for treating cultural
products as a substitute for religion. Second, there were the neo-Confucianists
who insisted upon the rationality of the Confucian faith. An example is Liang
Shuming’s effort on exploring elements of “modernity” in Confucianism in his
7The imperial examinations (Keju) determined who among the population would be
permitted to enter the state’s bureaucracy. The Imperial Examination System in China
lasted for 1300 years, from its founding during the Sui Dynasty in 605 to its abolition near
the end of the Qing Dynasty in 1905.
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Imperial examinations, last accessed March 29, 2009
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Eastern and Western Cultures and Their Philosophies.
The other main camp concentrated on critique of Chinese tradition. Ad-
mirers of Western culture advocated “westernization”. An extreme claim to-
wards was Chen Xujing’s (1934) idea of “wholesale Westernization” written
in his book The Future of Chinese Culture. Another more moderate claim
was Zhang Zhidong’s “Ti-Yong Formula” in the 1890s, which was an abbre-
viation of the phrase, “Chinese learning for the essence, Western learning for
practical development”. It expressed the idea that there was a deeply Chinese
moral and cultural foundation to society that would remain, even as China
adopted technology from the West to strengthen its own economy and mili-
tary (Spence 1990: 223-229). Ti-Yong advocates were “selective modernizers”,
to use Lieberthal’s term (1995). A late perspective on the influence of the West
on China’s modernization, mainly propagated by the CCP, followed Marxist
interpretation, which regarded Western penetration as the first step for China
towards modern development (Inglehart & Welzel 2005).
2.3 Summary
This chapter has pictured China’s modernization during the Republic era
from 1911 to 1949 in three steps. Firstly, the term “modernization” was defined
in the Chinese context by dividing modernizing societies into two categories as
firstcomers and latecomers. Second, four stages of China’s groping for modern-
ization since the mid 19th century were analyzed in retrospect, to show how it
started from strategic level, then through technological and political reforms,
and finally to public enlightenment in the beginning of the 20th century. And
thirdly, five intertwined main areas of China’s modernization were considered:
international context, political structure, economic structure and growth, so-
cial integration, and knowledge and education. The overall picture of China’s
modernization serves as a historical background for introducing citizen diplo-
macy in Chapter Three.
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Chapter 3
Conceptualization of China’s
Citizen Diplomacy
An important phenomenon accompanying China’s modernization was the
emergence of citizen diplomacy. As concluded in Introduction, citizen diplo-
macy means ordinary citizens supervising, supporting and affecting their own
government’s foreign policies and diplomatic activities by means of public opin-
ion and mass movements, so as to achieve the public’s aspirations and demands
for the interests of the country. However, the literature review also suggests
that the connotation of citizen diplomacy is a matter of constant construction
and reconstruction, following to the changes in China’s national situation.
There is no definite conclusion for its definition, but through contextualization
and comparison, a thorough understanding of citizen diplomacy in the first
half of the 20th century in China can still be achieved.
This chapter will examine the contextual specificity of China’s citizen diplo-
macy in section 3.1. Then, section 3.2 will highlight three aspects of it. And
in section 3.3, I provide a further understanding by comparing it with related
concepts. The changes in China’s citizen diplomacy, which was closely linked
to the two World Wars during the first half of the 20th century, will be discussed
in detail in Chapter Four.
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3.1 Contextual Specificity
Citizen diplomacy in current research, especially byWestern scholars, mostly
refers to informal interaction between members of adversarial states or prac-
tice of unofficial persons to explore the possibility of negotiating solutions in
the form of people-to-people communication (Muldoon et al. 2005; Jo¨nsson &
Langhorne 2004c). It functions as supplementary instruments of traditional
diplomacy, or tools of breaking the ice when official contact is in a stalemate.
As this unofficial channel can pave the way for the official “track one” diplo-
macy8, it is also called “track two” diplomacy. This type of citizen diplomacy
has been practiced in the field of culture, education, trade and investment
to promote better understanding and relations since the late half of the 20th
Century (Eastwood 2007).
The citizen diplomacy that featured China’s diplomatic activities during
the first half of the 20th Century followed a different pattern. It is essential to
distinguish these two kinds of citizen diplomacy even though they share the
signifier9 and overlap in functions such as complementing official diplomacy.
3.1.1 Interpretation of “Guomin”
“Citizen” here is translated from “guomin”, the form in the new romaniza-
tion system for Chinese characters, which originally means the common people.
There also exist other translations, such as “civil” (Deng 2007) or “national”
(Ren, 2006). The diversity of scholars’ translation of “guomin” in English is
due to the social conditions in which it was proposed by the intellectuals and
spread among the public.
“Guomin” was used as a broad concept in ancient Chinese literature such
as The Zuo Commentary (on The Spring and Autumn Annals)10 and The
8http://www.colorado.edu/conflict/peace/treatment/citdip.htm, last accessed on 9
March 2009
9Noun used in linguistics, means a sign’s physical form (such as a sound, printed word,
or image) as distinct from its meaning. Compare with signified.
10In Chinese, Zuo Zhuan. A famous historical book recording the history of the Spring and
Autumn Period (770-476BC), and is one of the three commentaries to the book of Chunqiu
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History of the Han Dynasty (Yin, 2004). The first use of “guomin” was in
The Zuo Commentary, Zhao Gong 13 : “The spirits gave their command in
his favor, and the people of the state trust him (xianshen ming zhi, guomin
xin zhi).” Its connotation covered both subjects of dynasties and plebeians in
the charge of feudal states. Nevertheless, subjects and plebeians were more
frequently used in ancient literature, owing to their reflecting inferiority and
superiority of social classes in ancient China.
The concept of “guomin” as a modern political term appeared in China
during the last period of the Qing dynasty. Here, as Liu (1995: 302-308) points
out, “guomin” is an item of “return graphic loan” that “refers to classical
Chinese-character compounds that were used by the Japanese to translate
modern European words and were reintroduced into modern Chinese”. In the
late 19th century, Japan’s rise after the Meiji Restoration aroused a strong wave
of Chinese youth studying in Japan, which facilitated the import and spread of
loan items. In other words, the reconceptualized “guomin” in modern China
was the correspondence to national crisis in the shadow of Western views of
civil rights. On the one hand, it reflected evocations for public concerns of
the survival and interests of the country; on the other hand, it expressed the
influence of Western ideas on China’s transition. Consequently, the meaning
of “guomin” in modern China was closely related to its counterpart in modern
Japan.
The first to use “guomin” in the modern sense was Kang Youwei. He
did not clearly redefine the meaning of “guomin” in his works, but closely
related it to Western-style education and China’s revitalization. These two key
points, the assimilation of Western values and concerns for national salvation,
turned into two dimensions of the meaning of “guomin” in modern China.
Another representative of China’s intellectuals, Liang Qichao, described his
ideal image of “guomin” in Collected Writings in the Ice-Drinker’s Cell (Vol.
4), which promoted ideas of independence and responsibility, consciousness of
being members of the nation, and political participation into national affairs.
Thus, “guomin” was referred to as a kind of identity as “sons and daughters of
(Spring and Autumn Annals).
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their country” instead of “the common people of dynasties or feudal states”.
“Citizen” in this thesis is used as the translation of “guomin” in the modern
sense.
3.1.2 Formulation of Citizen Diplomacy
Citizen and diplomacy are two important concepts in Western theories of
political science. The former means a member of a political community who
enjoys the rights and assumes the duties of membership11, and the latter is
generally referred to the conduct of relations between states and other entities
with standing in world politics by official agents and by peaceful means, which
implements foreign policy through negotiation (Sofer 1988).
However, the formulation of “citizen diplomacy” is from Japan. In mod-
ern times, Japan was the first Asian country that emancipated itself from the
shackles of unequal treaties through diplomatic negotiations, and then joined
the imperialist competition in the world. During the process of treaty revi-
sion, citizen diplomacy made undeniable contributions to the outcome (Yin,
2004). Japanese scholars firstly employed “guomin”, “kokumin” in Japanese
romanization system, to indicate the idea of popular sovereignty being taken
into the field of diplomacy (Liu 1995). This concept was then introduced to
China. The first article on citizen diplomacy, “On the Difference between
Citizen Diplomacy and Bureaucratic Diplomacy”12 published on Diplomatic
Review 13, was translated from Japanese (Zhou, 2008).
Rather than a response to “revolutions in information and communication
technologies” and “the worldwide rise in democratic expectations” in the late
period of the 20th century (Sharp 2001: 345), citizen diplomacy of the time in
China was more closely related to an earlier wave of diplomatic transformation
11http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/citizenship/, last access April 4, 2009.
12This article written by Ariga Nagao was translated from Japanese, originally printed in
June, 1909 (Meiji 42 in Japan)
13In Chinese, Waijiao Bao. It was the first newspaper in Modern China that commented
on international issues, launched on January 4, 1902 in Shanghai. Zhang Yuanji sponsored
the publication, pressed by the Commercial Press.
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that arose in the end of the First World War. This trend was calling for open
diplomacy and “democratic control of diplomacy” (Bullard 1917: 491-499)
and opposing traditional secret diplomacy (Zhou, 2008). The most famous
instance is the speech of the “Fourteen Points” addressed by the United States
President Woodrow Wilson in 1918, in which he called for “open covenants of
peace, openly arrived at, after which there shall be no private international
understandings of any kind but diplomacy shall proceed always frankly and in
the public view”14.
International jurist Zhou Gengsheng also stated three stages of diplomacy
based on his study of the process of diplomatic democratization after the First
World (Yin 2004: 21). That is, following imperial diplomacy (also called court
diplomacy) and governmental diplomacy (also called bureaucratic diplomacy),
diplomacy of modern states had grown to its third phase, citizen diplomacy.
In his view, the so-called citizen diplomacy did not mean that ordinary citizens
conduct foreign affairs themselves. The main point of citizen diplomacy was
to assure that a country’s foreign policies were directly or indirectly (through
representative institutions of the people) dominated by its citizens.
In short, modern politics required for democratization of diplomacy. The
open diplomacy pioneered this trend. China’s citizen diplomacy represented
public participation into diplomatic affairs in a collective manner, and the
“track two” diplomacy goes further to individual contacts in the field of diplo-
macy.
3.1.3 Response to National Salvation
One striking feature of China’s citizen diplomacy was the overwhelming
emphasis on national salvation, which generated a strong sense of crisis among
the public and then prompted mass impulse concerning foreign affairs. Thus,
the “stimulation-reaction” model characterized China’s citizen diplomacy. In
other words, China’s citizen diplomacy tended to function as a reaction to situ-
ation, like a remedy for disease. Its main task altered according to the changes
14http://wwi.lib.byu.edu/index.php/President Wilson%27s Fourteen Points, last access
April 10, 2009.
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in China’s national situation. Moreover, its interaction with governments and
main instruments also adjusted with respect to the alteration of the main task.
As stated in Chapter Two, the so-called national salvation contained two
dimensions: one referred to external threats to China’s independence and
sovereignty; the other was attributed to internal absence of central authority
and unstable political patterns. When the national crisis transferred to both
external and internal, the model of “stimulation-reaction” continued to work.
Nevertheless, not until the 1920s did the public pay equal attention to the in-
ternal dimension together with the external. The turning point was the Paris
Peace Conference. In the late 19th century, the failure of the Boxer Rebellion
proved that traditional violent protests could not improve the circumstances
of the country. Thus, to eliminate unequal treaties and to terminate colonial
occupation of the Great Powers in China through diplomacy prevailed in the
public. Additionally, the new trend of open diplomacy after the First World
War in the West reinforced these hopes of the Chinese. Taking account of
China’s situation at the time, neither military nor economic strength could
back the negotiations at international peace conferences. Diplomacy needs to
rely on the public support. Citizen diplomacy emerged as the times demanded.
However, the disappointing result of the Paris Peace Conference revealed the
importance of solving domestic political chaos and backwardness at the same
time. It was recognized that fundamental reforms inside China’s society were
necessary to achieve diplomatic goals in international community.
Consequently, the “stimulation-reaction” model without coordinative po-
litical instruction and organization constrained the development of China’s
citizen diplomacy. Moreover, limitations of the leadership and instruments of
citizen diplomacy also constrained its effects. The next section is dedicated to
investigating three aspects of China’s citizen diplomacy.
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3.2 Three Aspects of China’s Citizen Diplo-
macy: A Closer Look
With the change of the main task of China’s citizen diplomacy, its relation-
ship with governmental diplomacy was correspondingly adjusted. Moreover,
in this process, the leadership and main instruments of citizen diplomacy were
affected by its practice. This section will highlight these aspects of citizen
diplomacy, in order to deepen the understanding of it.
3.2.1 Relationship with Governmental Diplomacy
In terms of the interaction between governmental diplomacy and citizen
diplomacy, the most significant problem was whether the government was the
only accredited actor of diplomacy. Usually, governments are recognized as
legitimate subjects of foreign affairs by other countries, so that governmental
diplomacy dominates in diplomacy. Citizen diplomacy represented the rise
of the public and their strong willingness of political participation in foreign
affairs. Literally, the government should respect public opinion and citizens
should have the right to supervise the government’s diplomatic conducts.
However, China’s citizen diplomacy experienced twists and turns owing
to its relationship with governments, and correspondingly, so did its interac-
tion with governmental diplomacy. In the early days, citizen diplomacy was
conduct within the framework of existing laws and governmental regulations.
Emphasis on peaceful means and obedience to governmental control made cit-
izen diplomacy not form a strong diplomatic pressure towards governmental
diplomacy, which reflected a more positive interaction. By the mid-and late
1920s, owing to the public’s disappointment with the Beiyang government
and local warlord factions, the internal dimension of national salvation was
highlighted and it induced the change of the main task of citizen diplomacy.
The Beiyang government lost political and diplomatic authority, but the loss
provided favorable conditions for the public’s participation of foreign affairs.
Although citizen diplomacy played a relatively active role in diplomatic activ-
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ities during the Beiyang period, it failed to form an independent path in the
field of diplomacy during the Second World War.
3.2.2 From Merchants to Intelligentsia
The late period of the Qing dynasty witnessed great changes in foreign
policies and strong cultural enlightenment of the public. Comprehensive com-
mentaries in newspapers and periodicals advocated the rights of the public to
supervise and to participate in diplomacy (Ren 2006). The transitional pro-
cess of diplomatic thoughts was launched in China, and prepared the climax
of citizen diplomacy around the 1920s.
Despite the great contribution of the intelligentsia to the diffusion of the
idea of citizen diplomacy, their leadership was not as significant as merchants
until the May Fourth movement. China’s modern merchants led citizen diplo-
macy in the early era. In the process of social transition after the collapse of
the Qing dynasty, they reached out for more regional power and broadened
their conceptions of their roles in public affairs. As the lines between local and
national concerns began to blur, modern merchants started to engage in compe-
tition with official representatives of the country (Rankin 1986). Citizen diplo-
macy offered a good opportunity. Their concerns about their own economic
interests ensured that peaceful means of struggle would be adopted as main
instruments of citizen diplomacy. For instance, boycott movements against
American goods and Japanese goods during the 1900s used to be the most
effective way of involving the public to participate in citizen diplomacy. More-
over, this characteristic of modern merchants also reflected the consciousness
of civil rights in modern China, which was one effective component of China’s
safeguard of national sovereignty. However, in semi-colonial and semi-feudal
China, slow and inadequate development of national industries determined
that merchants could not lead citizen diplomacy for a long time.
Then, The intelligentsia became the leader stratum in citizen diplomacy
in the 1920s. Although they debated internally due to their divergence of
views of Western modernity, their propagation and advocacy in terms of the
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construction of the pubic sphere were influential among the public. Their
opinions dominated and they were regarded as representatives of the public.
Moreover, the relationship between the intelligentsia and governments varied
from decade to decade. Watershed appeared around the 1930s, after the KMT
national government established. Since then, the intelligentsia was gradually
incorporated into the bureaucratic system of the government. This partially
contributed to the transformation of the nature of citizen diplomacy.
3.2.3 Public Opinion, Mass Movements and Coopera-
tion with Overseas Chinese and Students Abroad
During the Beiyang period, citizen diplomacy entered a more mature stage.
Despite the controversy about its definition, consensus was reached concerning
the main instruments of it.
There were two main types: one was public opinion on foreign affairs, in-
cluding comments or observations published by intellectuals or other influential
individuals; the other was mass movements supported by large segments of the
population, such as parades, speeches and assemblies. Although it seemed that
the former worked through discourse while the latter stressed action, the two
actually relied heavily on each other – the mass movements benefited from
the propagation and support of public opinion. Meanwhile public opinion was
implemented in the form of mass movement.
The relationship between public opinion and mass movements also high-
lighted the issue of the relationship between the intelligentsia and the public.
The limitations of the intelligentsia were reflected on the practice of citizen
diplomacy. As stated in Chapter Two, the supporters of Western modernity
that received higher education abroad brought back norms and ideas that
were entirely new to the traditional Chinese society, while the nativists and
neo-confucianists debated on the opposite side. Both of the camps kept pub-
lishing magazines, newsletters or journals, which reduced the strength of the
intelligentsia as a social force to lead China’s citizen diplomacy.
Regarding influential scope, activities of citizen diplomacy developed from
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unilaterally domestic movements into cooperation between domestic groups
and overseas Chinese during the 1920s. After the First World War, the Citi-
zen Diplomacy Association was originally established by the intelligentsia as a
platform for discussions regarding agenda setting at the Paris Peace Conference
(Guo 2005). Then, it grew to a national organization of China’s citizen diplo-
macy and initiated more contact with overseas Chinese and students abroad
at the Washington Peace Conference, which expanded the influential sphere of
citizen diplomacy and also enhanced the effect of it.
3.3 Differentiation of Related Concepts
Some research categorizes citizen diplomacy into two strands (Deng, 2007;
Yin, 2004). One strand uses basically the same definition as the one adopted in
this thesis. In contrast, the second strand is overlapping with or even referring
to other related diplomatic terms, such as “track two” diplomacy and public
diplomacy. In fact, these concepts have similarities as well as differences. On
the one hand, China’s citizen diplomacy, “track two” diplomacy and public
diplomacy “share the reliance on indirect communication rather than direct
government-to-government communication (Jo¨nsson and Langhorne 2004c)”.
On the other hand, their differences are easy to see with comparison of two
elements: “by whom” and “to whom”:
As mentioned before, China’s citizen diplomacy was mainly conducted by
the domestic public and to lobby their own governments. “Track two” diplo-
macy, another kind of citizen diplomacy in Western literature, is performed
by unofficial people and to their counterparts in another country. And public
diplomacy15 is operated by governments and aims at citizens of other countries.
The real-world phenomena that two-level game modeling tries to explain,
however, shares some similarities with China’s citizen diplomacy. The model
15Refers to government-sponsored programs intended to inform or influence public opin-
ion in other countries, using instruments such as publications, motion pictures, cultural
exchanges, radio and television.U.S. Department of State, Dictionary of International Rela-
tions Terms, 1987, p. 85, http://www.publicdiplomacy.org/1.htm, last accessed on 9 March
2009.
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of two-level game has been developed into a very useful method of analyz-
ing the interaction of domestic and international negotiations. The assump-
tion that states are “unitary actors” has been relaxed to explore the conse-
quences of leaders’ attempts to balance domestic and international motiva-
tions. Thus, two institutional factors are pertaining to two-level games, the
domestic decision-making process and the structure of the international nego-
tiation (Kilgour & Wolinsky-Nahmias 2004). Regarding domestic politics, on
the one hand, internal issues and decision makers’ preference shape the negoti-
ation strategies of governments; on the other hand, a democratic system with a
parliamentary ratification procedure for international agreements is essential.
3.4 Summary
This chapter has examined the contextual connotation of China’s citizen
diplomacy, which contains three ingredients: traditional conceptions of citi-
zen (guomin), Western ideas of civil rights, and public concerns for national
salvation. A closer look was taken on three aspects of citizen diplomacy: rela-
tionship with governmental diplomacy, the change of leadership from modern
merchants to intellectuals, and two main instruments as public opinion and
mass movements that cooperated with overseas Chinese. In conclusion, al-
though citizen diplomacy mainly worked in the way of domestically lobbying
the Chinese government rather than foreigners, it represented the uncompro-
mising stand of the public in terms of national revitalization. In Chapter Four,
the changes in citizen diplomacy will be examined and related to China’s mod-
ernization from the 1920s to the 1940s, in order to see the relationship between
the two.
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Chapter 4
A Negative Relationship:
Comparing China’s
Modernization and the Changes
in Citizen Diplomacy
From the 1920s to the 1940s, there had been some changes in China’s
situation. These changes were closely related to the two World Wars and
affected the course of China’s modernization and activities of citizen diplomacy.
This chapter tries to identify the relationship between China’s modernization
and the changes in citizen diplomacy during this period.
In section 4.1, I provide a brief historical background of China in the first
half of the 20th century, emphasizing the changes that happened between the
two decades. Section 4.2 evaluates China’s modernization by using three cri-
teria, namely leadership, institution building and redistribution of resources.
Moving on to section 4.3, three aspects and cases of two international con-
ferences will be applied to examine the changes in citizen diplomacy. The
relationship between the two important phenomena is concluded in the sec-
tion 4.4.
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4.1 Changes from the 1920s to the 1940s
Generally speaking, changes in China’s situation during the decades ex-
isted in two dimensions. Externally, threats towards China’s national survival
declined. China started to exercise its sovereignty and independence in the
modern era. Nevertheless, even thought it attended almost all of the impor-
tant international conferences after the wars, China didn’t exert great influence
on the agendas or outcomes of treaties. Internally, various aspects of the so-
cial transition unevenly developed. Thus, progress took place somehow, but
modern values hardly syncretized into the intrinsically dominant political and
social norms. The clash lasted for years and wore down the process of transi-
tion.
4.1.1 International Environment
As a large but weak country in the first half of the 20th century, changes
in China’s international environment were not mainly reflected in China’s po-
sition in the international society, but displayed in China’s relationship with
other foreign countries (Lieberthal 1995). Although the solution of the Shan-
dong issue at the Paris Peace Conference mostly fell under the aftereffects
of the nineteenth-century unequal treaty system, in 1922 at the Washington
Conference, the Nine Power Treaty was signed to respect China’s territorial
integrity and political independence. The Great Powers that used to threaten
China’s national survival were weakened or even collapsed after the war, and
thus the relationship between them and China seemed alleviated. However,
this did not mean that foreign countries were prepared give up their privileges
in China. Having legislated on the policies of the “Opening of China”, West-
ern exploitation continued in the port cities and equal commercial opportunity
remained.
In terms of China’s domestic political pattern, principle powers at the
Washington Conference achieved consensus on taking cooperative moves to
unify China. However, outcomes of foreign interventions were not satisfactory.
In the early Republic era, the disjointed society of warlordism, the gap between
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central power and regional administration structure, caused the shortage of do-
mestic basis of such political unification (Esherick, 1976). The tension between
the KMT and the CCP further deteriorated such situation. For instance, the
Soviet Union was devoted to sponsoring and supporting the collaboration of the
KMT and the CCP in the Northern Expedition, but sharp conflicts between
the two parties in ideology and policy destined to their final split, which was
hastened by the growing conservatism of the KMT and the growing radicalism
of the CCP.
After the Second World War, the international configuration was reshuﬄed
and altered the old patterns of Western exploitation in China. In 1943 the
system of extraterritoriality was abolished by common agreement, and it was
agreed that Manchukuo and Taiwan would be returned to Chinese Nationalist
control after the war at the Cairo Conference (Spence 1990). But in 1945
Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill met at Yalta, without Jiang Jieshi’s (Chiang
Kai-shek) participation, and made clauses betrayed these agreements reached
during the wartime. Because the United States feared the struggle of the KMT
and the CCP would come to the forefront after the surrender of Japan, it was
seeking cooperation with the Soviet Union. Nevertheless, as Westad (1993)
comments, China was the first of many Asian countries in the postwar period
where Soviet-American rivalry influenced the course of domestic revolution. In
fact, when the cooperation of the big two turned into confrontation after the
Second World War, China’s postwar aspirations of national unification were
once again blown. The KMT-CCP enmity did not originally attribute to the
rivalry between the United States and the Soviet Union, but the latter led to
and worsen the former.
4.1.2 Inside the Chinese Society
Regarding this dimension, Lieberthal (1995: 27) concluded that “as late
as the 1890s Confucianism still dominated the ideological scene, foreign ways
were suspected, and a military career held little prestige. By the late 1910s, all
of this had changed. ” At the end of the First World War, the nominal central
government of the Republic of China, in effect the warlord Beiyang regime
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truly demised after Yuan shikai’s death. Although his successors, represented
by the Primier Duan Qirui, who hold the real power, still regarded themselves
the “national” government, the country actually had dissolved into regionally
based warlordism.
Even this so-called central government lost the support of the public due
to its yielding to the demands of turning German concessions in China’s Shan-
dong Province over to Japan instead of returning them to China at the Paris
Peace Conference. Chinese public indignation reached its climax, which was
reflected by the slogans of the May Fourth Movement – “externally, struggle for
sovereignty; internally, throw out the traitors (wai zheng guoquan, nei cheng
guozei).” The movement was initiated by students in Beijing who demon-
strated in protest against the Duan government’s humiliating policy towards
Japan (Zhou 1967). Other social classes such as merchants, industrialists and
urban workers later expressed their full support to students. And the voice of
the intelligentsia, in spite of debates inside the institution, conveyed the public
feeling of national humiliation widely throughout the country.
But shortly after this, the movement was allied with the Nationalists to
overthrow the warlord Beiyang regime, which contributed to the reorganiza-
tion of the KMT and the birth of the CCP during the 1920s. Sun Zongshan
(Sun Yat-sen), the first leader of the KMT, played an instrumental role in
the first collaboration of the two parties in order to fight the warlord rule.
This KMT-CCP collaboration was named the First United Front (1924-1927).
Nonetheless, after his death in 1925, the Northern Expedition finally freed the
KMT from depending on the support of the CCP and quickened his successor,
Jiang Jieshi’s (Chiang Kai-shek) decision to break with the CCP.
The Second United Front (1937-1945) between the KMT and the CCP
was formed to oppose Japanese aggression, and the Nationalist government
participated in international negotiations and conferences as China’s national
government during and after the Second World War. Thus, both the United
States and the Soviet were more willing to reach a China settlement that in-
ducted the Communists into the government as a minority (Gupta 1971). In
1946 the United States mediated between the two sides. After the Chongqing
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Negotiation, the Double-Ten Agreement between the KMT and the CCP was
reached to solve the conflicts between the two parties and to construct a new
China in a peaceful way. However, the agreement lacked practical discussions
about the implementation of its decisions, for example, specific arrangements
of the course of actions needed for taking over the liberated territory from the
Japanese. Ultimately, an all-out civil war burst out in 1947, right after the
Second World War. The CCP transformed its strategy of guerrilla war during
the Second World War to a new strategy of conventional war, which showed
its stopping obedience to central command of the Nationalist government and
enhancing its core principles of decentralization and local initiative. And the
Communists shifted the political line in late 1948 – a far milder land reform
was adopted in rural areas and promise of long-period “new democracy” before
an eventual transition to socialism was given to win national capitalists and in-
tellectuals in China’s major cities (Van de Ven 1991). Additionally, base areas
and powerful military groups enabled the CCP’s victories on battlefield against
the KMT. In 1949, the communists replaced the Nationalist government on
the Chinese mainland.
4.2 The Progress of China’s Modernization
Rozman (1981) identifies China as a “lagging latecomer” of modernization.
Xu and Chen (1996: 1-30) treat China’s modernization before 1949 as a prepa-
ration stage for the period after 1949. However, this is too general and ignores
the importance of relative growth of China’s modernization in the first half of
the 20th century. As I argued in Chapter Two, political reforms, industrial pro-
motion, public political participation, and cultural enlightenment took place
almost simultaneously in the process of China’s modernization during the first
half of the 20th century. But these aspects were unevenly developed, which
makes it difficult to evaluate China’s modernization. Here, three criteria are
suggested to deal with this problem.
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4.2.1 Leadership: the Rise and Decline of the Intelli-
gentsia
After the birth of the Republic of China, continuous efforts were made to
realize the transformation of traditional political power towards modernizing
leadership by Sun Zhongshan and other Republicans. But central control
and coordination were missing during the early Republic era (1912-1916) due
to the collapse of the Beiyang government and the warlord wars afterwards
(1916-1928). Thus, a powerful political leadership was largely absent in the
development of China’s modernization in the 1920s.
Chinese intelligentsia rose up in this situation. On the basis of the lessons
learnt from the failure of the top-down political reform in the late Qing, Chi-
nese intellectuals became conscious of the importance of the public in China’s
revitalization. Rather than politicians and bureaucrats, the Chinese intelli-
gentsia indeed pioneered, propelled and backed China’s social transition after
the First World War. Schwarcz (1978:1-2) terms the transformation of the
intellectuals into the “Chinese intelligentsia” the “history of consciousness”,
which “pressed beyond a concern with the content of knowledge to an investi-
gation of its social uses and enlightened public opinion.”
The role of the intelligentsia converted to the assistants and advisors, even
members of the government during the Nanjing decade under the rule of the
KMT. For instance, Hu Shi, the leader of the New Culture Movement, was
appointed as Jiang Jieshi’s envoy to the United States. And furthermore, af-
ter the Second World War, the intelligentsia became the lubricant between
the KMT and the CCP. Spence (1990) recorded a “political consultative con-
ference” in 1946, at which thirty-eight delegates assembled in Nanjing after
the day the KMT and the CCP reached a cease-fire agreement. Among the
delegates, over sixty percent were from the Youth party16, the Democratic
League17, other smaller political associations, and the unaffiliated. But their
voice and good intentions came to nothing eventually.
16A powerful and vocal group promoted the peaceful reconstruction of China.
17The League spoke for many of China’s liberal intellectuals.
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The decline of the leadership of the intelligentsia did not pessimistically
mean the decline of China’s modernization. On the contrary, it bespake the
increasing impact from political institutions. Moreover, China’s intelligentsia
only served a weak leadership in this process. This resulted from the gap
between them and the public that bequeathed from traditional social struc-
ture, their extremist and idealist attitudes that proved unrealistic, and lack of
executive power of their revolutionary proposals.
4.2.2 Establishment of Constitutional Institutions
In 1912 the Republican government was imposed in China, at least in
form, after the failure of political reform that sought to make a compromise
arrangement of a constitutional monarchy in the institution of the emperor-
ship during the late Qing period. A meaningful constitution that guaranteed
valid elections across China for the two-chamber parliament had been drafted
as the Provisional Constitution of the Republic of China since the early 1910s
(Wasserstrom 2003). But the designed republican political blueprint and its
constitutional institutions were left only on paper for two major reasons. First,
on the dimension of central governance, Yuan Shikai’s abandoning the rules
of the Provisional Constitution during the early Republic era, and the fre-
quent regime alterations during the Warlord era made the implementation of
the constitution lack driving force. Second, on the local dimension, political
reforms in the countryside seemed peripheral and insufficient. Attention was
paid to develop structures of local self-government by regional powers such
as the conservative gentry. This made the constitutional institution building
on this central dimension rootless (Schoppa 2003). Even the Constitutional
Protection Movements were launched twice and the Nationalist Nanjing Gov-
ernment restored the constitution in 1925, these two problems still remained
unsolved.
Essential changes had taken place since the establishment of the Nationalist
government in 1926. It met the strategic needs of national unity, which was
significant for program of China’s modernization. China obtained unification
to a certain degree in the charge of a modern central government for the
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first time in the 20th century. Even lost power in the Chinese mainland in
1949, the Nationalist government once achieved “total victory” in 1945 – as
mentioned before, the Nationalist government was recognized as the national
government of China by other countries in the international society; moreover,
its armies retrieved the coastal areas from the Japanese occupation after the
Second World War (Lieberthal 1995). Thus, the CCP could only cooperate
with the KMT as an opposition party before defeating it in the civil war. The
bureaucratic system of the Nationalist government was staffed by modern-
educated men from coastal cities that kept on serving the country until the
establishment of the People’s Republic of China.
However, the search for appropriate political institutions was more suc-
cessful at the theoretical level. It seemed that appeals for institution building
were fervent among the public, a preliminary civil society18. Foreign proposi-
tions and values were consciously used, modern techniques were adopted, and
the administration of local elites was disrupted or even replaced by new elite
activists (Rankin 1993). However, these modern values such as a national con-
stitution and institutions hardly coordinated into the intrinsically dominant
political norms.
4.2.3 Redistribution of Resources
As China was a latecomer that commenced the process of modernization
under imperial rule, resources inside the Chinese society were divided between
the Great Powers and the Qing government. When the imperial system col-
lapsed and the quasi-colonial rule was transferred to less aggressive foreign
interventions, there was a need for redistribution of resources. But the clash of
wars lasted for years wore down the process of industrialization and social in-
tegration, which dramatically influenced the redistribution of resources inside
18Rankin (1993: 159) defined civil society as ‘a major theme of Western political theory
since the early seventeenth century. It has been defined in many ways and has also assumed
different historical forms under “weak” states like England or “strong” ones like France or
Germany...an essential core seems to be the existence of social associations not dominated
by the state and capable of affecting official policy.’
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the Chinese society.
The development of China’s national industries featured the new pattern
of the Chinese society after the First World War. On the one hand, the new
urban interest groups19 rose up as an influential social class. So did urban
workers. On the other hand, the gap between the urban and the rural areas
was deepened. As a result, China’s industrialization failed to develop into
the Industrial Revolution20 in the West, which had been treated as the “great
divide” between the pre-modern world and the world of modernity. Sander-
son (1995) believes that it was capitalism that introduced the modern world
and made industrialization possible, so that capitalism was indispensable to
relate the rise of modernity to the industrialization; also, radical changes in
economic life and social organization, specifically the establishment of factory
system and enormous increases in the productivity of labour were essential
ingredients of industrialization. According to Sanderson’s standards, on the
one hand, China’s industrialization happened with an infirm basis of national
capitalism. Chinese national capitalism originated in private business of tex-
tile production in coastal cities as Suzhou during the late period of the Qing
dynasty. Room of development was explored after the self-sufficing economic
structure and the feudal ideology that traditionally held commerce in con-
tempt gradually crashed by the logic of capitalist societies that require capital
accumulation and capability of mass consumption. After the First World War,
the Great Powers returned to Chinese markets but their quasi-colonial rule in
China decreased after the Washington Peace Conference. Although Chinese
national industries experienced a sharp decline right after the war, they were
strong during the Golden Age of prosperity (1914-1919). On the other hand,
China’s industrialization was limited in the scale and degree, because the revo-
lution in technology did not convert to the revolution of economic organization.
Decentralized administration and alienation between the urban and the rural
19Mainly consist merchant, elite activists and industrialists.
20Given the definition by Stearns (1993), is “a massive set of changes that begin when
radical innovations in technologies and organizational forms are extensively introduced in key
manufacturing sectors and that end, in the truly revolutionary phase, when these innovations
are widely, though not necessarily universally, established in the economy at large.”
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areas disabled the economic changes in cities spilt into the countryside. Al-
though new elite activists started to replace the local conservative gentry to
dominate the administration in the rural areas (Rankin 1986), however, the
peasantry kept being excluded from resources share.
During the Second World War, China’s industrial production expanded
significantly, and commerce grew fast. And many a “bottom-up” economic and
social organizations developed in various locales, such as chambers of commerce
and trade unions, which brought about significant experiments in social and
economic reform in some rural counties. China attained its peak levels output
in industry, agriculture, and commerce in the late 1930s. (Lieberthal 1995:
34). Although the economic crisis and inflation confronted China after the
war, the destructive impact was relatively finite due to the limited scope of
China’s industrialization and rural reforms.
Meanwhile, social integration was to some extend improved with the rising
influence of the CCP. After Jiang Jieshi’s breaking up with the CCP in the
late 1920s, the Communists encountered great failure and suppression in the
big cities. They realized that their greatest allies were the poorer peasants and
the landless farm laborers in the intuitionally weak rural areas. In the year
following the Japanese surrender the Communists intensified their land-reform
program that promised to sought the elimination of tenancy and the equal-
ization of property within the villages (Spence 1990: 492). Taking the rural
base as the shield and buckler, the CCP returned to big cities to exercise its
municipal powers by mobilizing urban workers to back the People’s Liberation
Army. No matter whether the new urban interest groups and urban workers or
the peasantry, the majority of Chinese, enjoyed the fruit of the redistribution,
it was the CCP that eventually succeeded in integrating resources as well as
the whole Chinese society after its victory in the civil war.
4.3 The Decline of Citizen Diplomacy
It is necessary to state that, during the late period of the Qing dynasty,
there had been mass movements attempting to influence national foreign rela-
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tions, for instance, anti-foreign religious struggle throughout the country from
1860 to 1890, and the Boxer Rebellion. However, fundamentally, those strug-
gles could not be incorporated into the activities of China’s citizen diplomacy.
It is because those movements aimed at restoring the tributary system before
modern times, which was rather different from the pursuit of peaceful solutions
to conflicts and disputes by modern diplomatic means in the international com-
munity – the purpose of citizen diplomacy. Also, essentially speaking, China’s
citizen diplomacy could only base on the emergence of citizen in modern sense.
To compare the development of citizen diplomacy after the two World
Wars, according to Chapter Three, three aspects could serve as indicators for
comparison. First is the main task. As stated in Chapter Two, China’s citi-
zen diplomacy emerged when China faced severe threats towards its national
survival. As the respond of the imperatives of national salvation, the main
task of citizen diplomacy was adjusted according to changes in international
and domestic situation of China. A second aspect is the relationship between
citizen diplomacy and governmental diplomacy. Two points need to be consid-
ered here: who were the principal actors of China’s national diplomacy? And
how did these two kinds of diplomacy interacted? Furthermore, as the leading
role played by merchants in the early 20th century had been taken over by
the Chinese intelligentsia since the May Fourth Movement, this criterion also
correlated to examine the relationship between Chinese intelligentsia and the
government. The third aspect is the main instruments of citizen diplomacy,
especially the expansion of its influential scope. The Paris Peace Conference
and the Washington Peace Conference are used to illustrate the changes.
4.3.1 The Embryonic Stage: from 1900s to the Early
1910s
China’s citizen diplomacy emerged in the beginning of the 20th century.
Several anti-foreign boycott movements, the Rail-Rights Recovery Movement21
21Railway building was not the main concern of China’s industrial development until 1895.
Realizing the importance of railroads, the Qing government began to build its own railways,
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and resistant movements against the Twenty-One Demands characterized China’s
citizen diplomacy in the beginning of the 20th century as follows:
MAIN TASK. Protest at external threats against China’s survival was the
main purpose of citizen diplomacy at this stage. There was no doubt that
either in the late Qing dynasty, or in the early Republic era, dissatisfaction
with the central government existed among political parties, organizations and
individuals. But they had been showing a strongly convergent intention of
supporting the government when national survival was threatened externally.
In the resistance movement to the Japanese Twenty-One Demands, all the
parties and non-governmental organizations expressed their full support of the
Yuan Government regardless of uprisings against Yuan Shikai before. This,
on the one hand, reflected a public consensus of national supremacy, but on
the other hand, also reflected the immature side of citizen diplomacy. At that
time, to lift these external threats was the one and only main task of China’s
citizen diplomacy.
RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENTAL DIPLOMACY. The govern-
ment was seen as the only principal actor of national diplomacy, whose diplo-
matic activities were uncritically supported by the public. It was agreed that
foreign affairs ought to be conducted by the representatives authorized by the
government. Various non-governmental organizations and individuals consid-
ered themselves reinforcements of the government. In most cases, the govern-
ment did take advantage of the public support to negotiate with the Great
Powers. In the 1905 anti-American boycott, Liang Cheng, the envoy of the
Qing dynasty in the United States, put forward an argument in his note to
the Department of State, which alleged that “popular sentiment could not to
suppress strongly” (Ren 2006).
but only by borrowing loans from foreign countries and mortgaging Chinese revenue system.
This contributed to the rise of economic nationalists to recover these rights. Provincial gentry
and merchants pulled together not only against state control but also foreign encroachment.
It therefore developed into a conflict against the state control of industrial activities as well as
a battle for national sovereignty. The most controversial ones were the disputes over the two
railway lines: the Canton-Hankow Railway (Yuehan) and the Shanghai-Hanchow-Ningpo
Railway (Huning) (Esherick 1976).
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MAIN INSTRUMENTS. The scope and effectiveness of citizen diplomacy
were rather limited in the beginning of the 20th century. Overseas Chinese
showed strong willingness to support both the boycott to American goods and
the boycott to Japanese goods. However, merchants and chambers of com-
merce, as leaders of citizen diplomacy at this stage, did not initially coordinate
the overseas support with domestic public opinion to advocate propositions of
the Chinese people (Yin 2004). Consequently, achievements of citizen diplo-
macy were restricted by the failure of influencing opponent countries’ China
policies from within.
4.3.2 After the First World War: around the 1920s
The Paris Peace Conference22 was an international meeting convened in
January 1919 at Versailles to establish the terms of the peace after the First
World War. President Woodrow Wilson was a strong advocate of “open diplo-
macy” as he believed it would prevent future wars. At the end of the First
World War, secret diplomacy and secret treaties were condemned as real causes
leading to the war. Thus, because of the enormous destruction brought about
by the war, promotion of public diplomacy had become a trend of the time. De-
mocratization of diplomacy was advocated worldwide, which greatly enhanced
the influence of the common people on foreign affairs.
Though nearly thirty nations participated, the representatives of Great
Britain, France, the United States, and Italy became known as the “Big Four”,
who dominated the proceedings that led to the formulation of the Treaty of
Versailles. These agreements tended to focus on postwar redistribution of
territories, and Article 156 transferred German concessions in Shandong to
Japan. The Duan government expressed that it was “pleased to agreed” on
the solution to Shandong Problem in the exchange letter of China and Japan,
which directly resulted in China’s failure of diplomacy during the Peace Con-
ference (Guo 2005). And this recognition became the fuse of the May Fourth
22Definition of the Paris Peace Conference, see http://www.state.gov/r/pa/ho/time/wwi/
89875.htm, last accessed May 23, 2009
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Movement. Since the end of the 1910s, the Beiyang government had been
struggling to hold on to power, which step by step deteriorated the Provi-
sional Constitution of the Republic of China. Yuan Shikai signed the Japanese
Twenty-One Demands despite public opposition in 1915. On a quid pro quo
basis, he shortly restored the imperial regime and proclaimed himself the em-
peror with the assistance of Japan. The Beiyang government became widely
criticized. Yuan Shikai’s successors internally surged waves of regime change
due to factionalism, and externally sacrificed national interests in exchange
for the support of imperialists. Incompetent in handling domestic disturbance
and unequal treaties, the Beiyang government eventually not only lost public
trust and support, but also sank into a crisis of legitimacy. In this situation,
the public voice in opposition to the government became increasingly strong.
Citizen diplomacy progressed along with the rising appeal of “diplomatic
self-determination”. Moreover, owing to the accumulation of practical experi-
ence of diplomatic movements, it was realized that relying solely on traditional
means as assemblies, parades and boycotts were no longer enough for the pub-
lic to participate in foreign affairs. Consequently, practice of citizen diplomacy
and public concerns of foreign affairs jointly prompted the transformation of
citizen diplomacy. In 1921 representatives of the world’s great powers met at
the Washington Peace Conference to establish a naval arms control regime and
to bring stability to East Asia. The performance of China’s citizen diplomacy
featured China’s diplomatic success at the conference (Deng 2007).
MAIN TASK. After the Paris Peace Conference, internal struggle against
warlord government was added to the main task of citizen diplomacy besides
protest at external theats towards national survival, which brought about al-
teration of the main task of citizen diplomacy. Ineffective diplomatic activities
and humiliating compromise of the Beiyang government at international con-
ferences resulted in public dissatisfaction and opposition of it. Furthermore,
regarding the causation between the failure of national diplomacy and the rule
of the Beiyang government, the public realized that foreign affairs and internal
affairs were intertwined with each other. After the establishment of the Na-
tionalist government, the KMT clearly put abolition of unequal treaties down
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in its own guiding principles. For a period of time, complete abolition of un-
equal treaties system not only served tactically as a policy of the KMT, but
also strategically as a way of the KMT’s developing new political resources
from industry and agriculture (Sigel 1978).
RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENTAL DIPLOMACY. Responding
to the actions of the Chinese government at the Paris Peace Conference, the
public became strongly resistant to governmental monopoly in diplomacy and
desired more diplomatic self-determination. Government was no longer the
only principal actor that conducted foreign affairs; citizens also shared this role
in diplomatic field. On the basis of domestically based lobbying the govern-
ment, the public started to seek supervision of the government and to conduct
diplomatic activities on behalf of the country themselves (Sharp 2001). Before
the commence of the Washington Conference, Yu Rizhang and Jiang Menglin
were elected citizen representatives for the Conference at the meeting of the
Pacific Association organized by Shanghai General Chamber of Commerce and
eight other commercial societies. Shortly afterwards, the two were once again
elected on behalf of China at the joint meeting held by the country’s two
largest federations – Federation of Chambers of Commerce and Federation of
Education. Yu and Jiang, with the delegates of the Beiyang government, went
to the United States to attend the Washington Peace Conference. Their par-
ticipation in the Conference signaled the transformation of the role of citizens
in foreign affairs, from supporters of governmental diplomacy to being part of
the principal actors of national diplomacy (Xiong 2008).
MAIN INSTRUMENTS. The instruments of citizen diplomacy also diver-
sified, from merely domestic publishing and movements to interaction with
overseas Chinese and students abroad, and the scope of citizen diplomacy
expanded correspondingly. Failure of taking advantage of the strengths of
overseas Chinese to advocate propositions of Chinese people during the Paris
Peace Conference in 1919 taught the public a big lesson. Besides the govern-
ment’s compromises and weak national strength, it was believed that ineffective
publicity abroad also contributed to the failure of China’s diplomacy. The im-
portance of influencing other countries from within was highlighted after the
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May Fourth Movement. Thus, at the Washington Peace Conference, strength
of publicity abroad was obviously increased, and various domestic groups tried
to provide manifold channels for the outside world to understand the views of
the people at home, which could be divided into three main categories:
Firstly, domestic groups voluntarily and directly sent telegrams to foreign
national leaders and representatives who were capable of influencing the out-
come of the Conference. Second, citizen representatives functioned as agency
between governmental delegates and the domestic public, exchanging opinions
of both sides and updating the progress in Washington for the public. The
third channel was publicity through the contact between citizen representatives
and overseas Chinese and students in the United States, which drew great at-
tention of foreign media and representatives. All the instruments improved
the effects of domestic-foreign interaction (Guo 2005).
4.3.3 During and after the Second World War: around
the 1940s
Since the late 1930s, during the years from the 1937 Sino-Japanese War to
the civil war, fundamental changes had happened to citizen diplomacy. With
the political centralization and unification, though not complete, and severe
theats of national survival of the war, citizen diplomacy was integrated in gov-
ernmental diplomacy to serve China’s national foreign policies. The leadership,
the relationship with governmental diplomacy and the main instruments of cit-
izen diplomacy were changed correspondingly. At this point of time, China’s
citizen diplomacy underwent fundamental changes and differed to the citizen
diplomacy before the 1930s.
MAIN TASK. The establishment of the Nationalist government and the
burst out of the Sino-Japanese War requested adjustments of the main task of
citizen diplomacy. On the domestic side, the Nationalist government obtained
a certain degree of centralization and established relatively modernizing bu-
reaucratic system. Moreover, public recognition of its legitimacy and authority
enabled it to play a guiding role in public opinion, which was helpful for the
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government to implement foreign policies. On the external side, the nationwide
anti-Japanese war symbolized national unification and cooperation. Thus, the
main task of citizen diplomacy returned to mainly focus on the external dimen-
sion. However, this did not mean that citizen diplomacy at this time was just
the restoration of what it used to be. In fact, the transformation of its main
task brought about fundamental changes of its leadership and thus the rela-
tionship with the governmental diplomacy, which dramatically diminished its
function of public supervision of the government. Even in the situation of the
civil war, protest at postwar unequal treaties was much stressed, as achieving
national unification and cooperation were the top priority of the Nationalist
government internally.
RELATIONSHIP WITH GOVERNMENTAL DIPLOMACY. The public
became the principal actor of diplomacy, not in official foreign activities, but
in people-to-people communication. It seemed that citizen diplomacy was
transformed to another type of diplomacy, “track two” diplomacy, the imple-
mentation of which was primarily through private interactions between various
social classes, individuals from all walks of life and non-governmental organiza-
tions. Nevertheless, this kind of China’s citizen diplomacy had a semi-official
nature, which made it different from “track two” diplomacy in the West. Indi-
vidual activities were under the guide of the government, or even directly led
and organized by the government. Citizen diplomacy as a whole became an
integral part of governmental diplomacy, which served as one of the main in-
struments of the government to carry out its foreign policies. Thus, who would
participate in these diplomatic activities was determined by the government.
In fact, preference was given to elites and celebrities, which further enlarged
the gap between the intelligentsia and the common people. For instance, in
1938 Song Qingling established “China Defense League” in Hong Kong, aiming
at wartime medical relief and child health work. She adopted various meth-
ods and channels to raise funds from overseas Chinese and the international
community, purchasing medicines, medical equipment and other materials to
support the war. However, her identity as the wife of Sun Zhongshan and the
mother of the country enabled her to employ governmental resources in her
50
individual activities (Yin 2004).
MAIN INSTRUMENTS. The main instruments became much milder as
the role of citizen diplomacy was mainly the assistant of official contact, which
ranged from individual contacts to non-governmental meetings of organiza-
tions. Hu Shi, as the Dean of the Philosophy Department of Beijing Univer-
sity, conducted citizen diplomacy in Western countries as the United States,
Canada, the United Kingdom and Switzerland during the Second World War.
He gave speeches to the public and the governments of these countries, in-
troducing China’s wartime situation, demonstrating resolve of the Chinese to
resist against Japanese aggression, and illustrating the significance of the anti-
Japanese War, in order to win the support of the West (Ma 2005). During
the same period, there also exited demonstrations, parades and other mass
movements that represented public concerns of national situation, but they
obviously were no longer the main category of the instruments of citizen diplo-
macy.
4.4 A Negative Relationship in Terms of Changes
In retrospect of the course of China’s modernization, progress took place
in some aspects; meanwhile, frustration happened in others. Comparing its
development from the 1920s to 1940s, a unified central government was prelim-
inarily established, and the KMT gradually substituted for the intelligentsia
as the leading stratum of China’s modernization. Modernizing political insti-
tutions were built to some extent, while mainly in the urban areas along with
industrialization. The rise of the CCP, although intensified internal political
struggle, improved social integration and coordination of resources inside the
regions under its control. China’s modernization was incomplete as a whole
and unbalanced in respective aspects, but China’s transition towards a modern
society progressed. Its absolute achievements declined in amount sometimes,
but from the perspective of relative changes, the level of China’s modernization
increased.
Citizen diplomacy, as a historical concept, underwent fundamental changes
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in the late 1930s. Its connotation in the 1920s differed from that in the 1940s.
At the end of the First World War, citizen diplomacy primarily referred to
public supervision, support and impact on the government in terms of foreign
policies and diplomatic activities, so as to achieve the public’s aspirations and
demands for the interests of the country. Its main instruments were public
opinion and mass movements, which expanded from domestic activities to
cooperation with overseas Chinese and students abroad. In 1940s, due to the
integration of citizen diplomacy into governmental diplomacy under the rule
of the Nationalist government, it transformed to something else comparing to
citizen diplomacy in the 1920s. Seemingly, it resembled “track two” diplomacy
in the form of people-to-people communication; essentially, it functioned as an
official instrument in foreign affairs in the name of diplomatic democratization.
In conclusion, China’s modernization achieved a certain degree of multi-
faceted progress from the 1920s to the 1940s, although the accomplishments
were not significant. Inversely, citizen diplomacy experiences a transforma-
tion to an integrative part of governmental diplomacy, reducing to a shadow.
Demands of public participation into diplomacy declined, as opportunities
and channels of such participation decreased. Thus, a negative relationship
was presented by comparing China’s modernization and the changes in citizen
diplomacy during the decades.
4.5 Summary
In this chapter, China’s modernization was examined and compared to the
changes in citizen diplomacy from the 1920s and the 1940s, on the basis of
a brief introduction of the historical background. Indicators as leadership,
institution building and redistribution of resources were adopted to look at
the program of China’s modernization. Regarding the issue of citizen diplo-
macy, three aspects as the main task, its relationship with government and the
main instruments are used with cases of the Paris Peace Conference and the
Washington Peace Conference to show the development of it. It is concluded
that there was a negative relationship between China’s modernization and the
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changes in citizen diplomacy. Explanation of this negative relationship will be
provided in Chapter Five.
Chapter 5
Explaining the Negative
Relationship
Both citizen diplomacy in China and Japan and “track two” diplomacy
in the West are manifestations of “democratization of diplomacy”. The ex-
perience of Japan and Western countries suggests that democratization of
diplomacy tends to evolve simultaneously with modernization, regardless of
whether the country is a firstcomer or a latecomer in this process. Paradoxi-
cally, China’s citizen diplomacy declined as modernization progressed from the
1920s to the 1940s, as concluded in Chapter Four.
This chapter aims at explaining this negative relationship. Section 5.1 will
start by criticizing the unspoken assumption of the causation between modern-
ization and democratization of diplomacy, and will then proceed to developing
an analysis model to examine the correlation between the two, on the basis of
Black’s theory of “four phases of modernization”. In section 5.2, the model
will be applied to explore the conditions of a positive relationship between
modernization and democratization of diplomacy by means of generalizing the
experience of countries that underwent such a pattern. In section 5.3, I will
analyze to what extent China fulfilled or failed to fulfill these conditions, in
order to explain why China experienced a negative relationship.
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5.1 Correlating and Modeling
As mentioned in Chapter Two, modernization is a multifaceted process by
which societies are transformed under the impact of the scientific and techno-
logical revolution, signaling a stage of cognition in which it is believed that
human control over nature increases. And according to Chapter Three, citizen
diplomacy in this thesis refers to public consciousness and their advocate of
political participation into national foreign affairs by supervising, supporting
and affecting their own government’s foreign policies through public opinion
and mass movements, so as to achieve the public’s aspirations and demands
for the interests of the country. It represented the trend in “democratization
of diplomacy” that began in the early 20th century, which was pioneered by
open diplomacy and went further to “track two” diplomacy.
The Chinese case shows that a positive relationship between moderniza-
tion and democratization of diplomacy cannot be taken for granted. And as
mentioned in the beginning of this chapter, whether the relationship is posi-
tive or negative cannot simply attributes to whether a country belongs to the
firstcomers or the latecomers. Despite the division between these two cate-
gories, countries in the same group might perform differently and establish
different institution systems in the process of modernization. Nevertheless,
universality still exists in the functions of institutions when societies are trans-
formed towards modernity (Black 1966), which enabled countries that belong
to both categories and with different political regimes to produce analogous
societal consequences. Therefore, it is more appropriate to explore conditions
of forming a positive relationship by generalizing the experience of the coun-
tries of which modernization evolved simultaneously with democratization of
diplomacy. That is, under what conditions promotion and implementation of
democratic values in the diplomatic field will happen as modernization goes
on. Then, the negative relationship between China’s modernization and of the
changes in citizen diplomacy could be explained by examining to what extent
China fulfilled or failed to fulfill these conditions.
To observe how modernization commenced and evolved, Black theorizes
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four phases of modernization, which are allegedly applicable to all modernizing
societies:
“...(1) the challenge of modernity - the initial confrontation of a so-
ciety, within its traditional framework of knowledge, with modern
ideas and institutions, and the emergence of advocates of moder-
nity; (2) the consolidation of modernizing leadership - the transfer
of power from traditional to modernizing leaders in the course of a
normally bitter revolutionary struggle often lasting for several gen-
erations; (3) economic and social transformation - the development
of economic growth and social change to a point where a society is
transformed from a predominantly rural and agrarian way of life to
one predominantly urban and industrial; and (4) social integration
- the phase in which economic and social transformation produces
a fundamental reorganization of the social structure throughout the
society.”
Although the challenge of modernity in most cases initiated the process
of modernization regardless of whether it occurred internally or externally, it
is neither supposed that all other phases have to take place in proper order,
nor that the transformation is sufficient and complete in each society. In
the real world, how societies undergo the four phases and to what extent
previous gains are digested decide to what extent modernization evolves and
whether the democratization of diplomacy develops simultaneously. Therefore,
on the basis of Black’s four phases of modernization, I develop an analysis
model to probe the correlation between modernization and democratization of
diplomacy. Three main steps are listed as follows:
1. Tracing the emergence of modernity, not to see whether they emerged
internally or externally to the society, but to see whether the challenge of
modernity was overcome. In other words, how they confronted traditional
thoughts that were originally dominant in the society, and what kind of
impact they exerted on the course of modernization.
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2. Mapping the patterns of modernization, not emphasizing the specific
course of modernization, but to figure out to what level countries were
modernized and why they achieved such accomplishments. Three criteria
of evaluating modernization are again adopted, for the sake of compari-
son.
3. Highlighting implications for democratization of diplomacy, or citizen
diplomacy in China, and thus to explain why democratization of diplo-
macy grew in some modernizing societies but faded away in others.
5.2 Generalization of the Experience: Form-
ing a Positive Relationship
After the First World War and Wilson’s speech of the “Fourteen Points”,
open diplomacy became populated across the world. Democratization of diplo-
macy evolved simultaneously with modernization in countries that belong to
both firstcomers and latecomers, and with different institution systems. This
section is dedicated to exploring conditions of forming such a positive relation-
ship by generalizing the experience of these countries.
5.2.1 Overcoming the Challenge of Modernity
No matter whether there is only one modernity that is limited to describe
the characteristics common to countries that are most advanced in techno-
logical, political, economic and social development, say firstcomers, or there
are many, emergence of modernity brought about challenge to the traditional
structure and norms in all societies (Gule and Storebø1993).
In the Western context, modernity represents a set of social values emerged
from within, rooted in traditional Western philosophy. Modernization thus is
widely based in, or at least easily spread and accepted by the people. It is also
an age-long experience. In most respects, these firstcomers in the West had the
easiest time of modernization, for they were able to digest the new knowledge
and technology over a considerable period of time and to absorb the impact
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gradually. Japan, by contrary, met the challenge of modernity externally. But
only after a short time, it accepted and adapted itself to the Western values.
Debates concerning the import of Western ideas of modernity did take place,
but not lasted for long. This helped Japan carry on political reforms at a fast
pace, and therefore got modernized in other aspects of society.
This does not mean that modernization of these countries was a smooth
process. They encountered crises as well as stable periods during which moder-
nity was converted to every aspect of social life. But thanks to overcoming the
challenge of modernity, these countries were able to develop moderate patterns
of modernization according to the characteristics of their own societies.
5.2.2 Patterns Based on Coordination and Control
The three criteria proposed in Chapter Four, leadership, establishment of
constitutional institutions and redistribution of resources, are also adopted
here to evaluate the modernization of these countries that overcame the chal-
lenge of modernity, and to picture the scope and depth obtained in the process
of social transition from the traditional to the modern stage.
LEADERSHIP. Black (1966: 64) suggests two sources of leadership of po-
litical modernization. The first source is the incumbent traditional leadership,
who would accept the modern knowledge and undertake fundamental mod-
ernizing reforms. Japan developed high government centralization through
political reform, which encouraged learning from the West and started in tech-
nology and industrialization. The second source consists of dissident members
of the traditional political leadership and members of the legal, medical and
business professions, who argue for influence on public policy commensurate
with their substantive contribution to the society. They advocated for over-
throwing the traditional ruling oligarchy, even by extreme revolution. France
represents such modern governance that advocates relaxations of centraliza-
tion and increases in laissez-faire arrangements (Levy 1972). No matter how
political modernization is implemented, the nature of such implementation is
coordination and control.
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ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTIONS. The ac-
complishment of a political leadership of modernization laid the foundation
of establishing constitutional institutions. A modern government would not
operate without the rule of law maintained by a highly organized bureaucracy.
Constitutional institutions shouldered the responsibility of consolidating regu-
lations and procedures both in processing public affairs and emergency policy-
making. Moreover, it helped to build a closer relation between the modern
government and its citizens. Channels of communication were set up to con-
necting the two sides, by which citizens would get more information about the
government’s policies and thus improve their understanding and supervision.
The implementation of the rule of law guaranteed such public participation
into political affairs, which benefited the rise of the civil society.
REDISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES. Modern knowledge was brought
to the public through literature, art and mass education. Therefore, it offered
a wide and solid foundation for modernizing and transferring power from tra-
ditional institutions. Dramatic growth of science and technology underlay the
Industrial Revolution in the early 19th century (Sanderson 1995). Resources
like rural lands and consumer production were redistributed from traditional
power holders to new rising forces from various walks of life. Therefore, eco-
nomic developments, rather than political transformation, profoundly affected
the daily life of the great majority of the people. After establishing political
institutions, other institutions such as banks and business enterprises were also
built to perform functions of allocating resources. For instance, investment and
savings were two essential functions correlated with distribution of income. As-
sociated with extension of literacy by education and a higher level of income,
urbanization to a great extent eliminated the gap between the urban and the
rural areas. Societies that were composed predominantly of peasants changed
to societies in which a majority lived in cities with in a few generations.
5.2.3 Implications for Democratization of Diplomacy
Countries that overcame the challenge of modernity and developed mod-
erate centralized governance to coordinate and control the course of modern-
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ization achieved relatively sufficient and complete redistribution of resources
and obtained a high level of modernization. As shown in Table 5.2.3, Inglehart
and Welzel (2005: 25) illustrate the emancipative effect of such socioeconomic
development, and argue that as objective constraints on human choice relax,
the desire for mass self-expression takes higher priority in a society. They
(2005: 149) also point out that rising mass self-expression values transform
modernization into a process of human development, which encourages the
emergence and flourishing of democratic institutions. And the crucial element
of democratization is that it empowers people, say provides civil and political
rights, entitling people to freedom of choice in their private and public actions.
Therefore, firstly, public concerns and demands of their participation into
national foreign affairs were aroused. The idea of democratization of diplomacy
catered to this trend among the public. Second, the public had capability
and opportunities to affect the government in terms of its policy-making and
conduct in diplomacy. Finally, constitutional institutions were established to
guarantee that the government would adopt reasonable advice from the public,
and individuals were endowed with the freedom of expression. These three
aspects can also be concluded as three basic conditions for the emergence and
growth of democratization of diplomacy in the process of modernization.
In short, the countries in which a positive relationship between modern-
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ization and democratization of diplomacy was formed generally succeeded in
coordinating and implementing modern values and ideas into moderate cen-
tralization and redistribution of resources, thus accomplishing a high level
of modernization. Consequently, three conditions of democratization of diplo-
macy were fulfilled: (1) spontaneous appeals for public participation into diplo-
matic affairs; (2) capabilities and opportunities of implementing such concerns
and demands; and (3) institutional guarantee of the interaction between the
government and the public in terms of diplomacy. When modernization could
create these three conditions as it progressed, democratization of diplomacy
could emerge and grow simultaneously.
5.3 The Chinese Case: Why a Negative Rela-
tionship?
In Chapter Four, it was demonstrated that China’s modernization had
made some progress by comparing its development in the 1920s and in the
1940s. By contrary, citizen diplomacy underwent fundamental changes and
reduced to a shadow of governmental diplomacy in the decades. China failed to
form a positive relationship between modernization and the changes in citizen
diplomacy.
But it was also noted that China still had a long way to catch up the
countries that had achieved a high level of modernization. According to the
conclusion in the previous section, the three conditions for the emergence and
growth of democratization of diplomacy, citizen diplomacy in China, were not
entirely met in the course of China’s modernization. Therefore, to answer the
question of why the negative relationship happened in China, one needs to
answer the question of why China’s modernization, with the progress of itself,
was rather insufficient and incomplete firstly. And then, why the development
of citizen diplomacy was frustrated as the modernization progressed could be
explained.
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5.3.1 Tensions Resulted from the Challenge of Moder-
nity
Levy (1972: 5) proposes four propositions that maintained regardless of
how modernization grew, which explains how the ideas of modernity spread.
“First, with the passage of time it becomes increasingly probable
that the people possessed these modernized patterns will come into
contact with those who lack them. Second, once this contact is made
C and quite regardless of whether force is used C it is increasingly
probable that some of these modernized patterns will be taken up by
those who have them not. Third, when those patterns are taken up,
many of the indigenous (nonmodernized) patterns of the peoples
concerned will come apart at the seams. Fourth, following those
contacts, some changes in the direction of the modernized patterns
will take place C but not necessarily successfully.”
Correspondingly, the challenge of modernity came externally to the Chi-
nese when the West started to explore new markets and resources across the
world in the 15th and 16th century. As Tong (1993: 124) argues, “a nation’s
tradition plays a different role in an indigenously evolved modernization from
that in an externally caused modernization”. Unlike Japan, modern knowledge
stimulated some social changes in the intellectual and technological fields from
the late Ming and early Qing period, but its impact on the Chinese society
was limited in scope and depth until the 1910s. Until the late Qing, many still
thought that the Chinese cultural tradition was the only intellectual source
that could provide the wisdom and norms to orient the human mind and so-
cial action, and that Western science and technology had developed from a
Chinese origin. In the 1915 New Culture Movement, three types of tensions
were provoked after the clash between modern values and Chinese traditional
ideology lasted for decades.
The first strand was the tension inside the Chinese intelligentsia, between
the Western admirers and the cultural conservatists, which was traced in Chap-
ter Two. The former advocated modernization following model countries, but
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the latter sought whether Confucianism could be blended with modernity or
be found in neo-Confucianism.
The second strand was the tension between the intelligentsia and the pub-
lic in China’s enlightenment. As Schwarcz (1985) believed, enlightenment
was defined as self-emancipation from religion dogma and Kant’s answer to
“what is enlightenment?” summarized the thoughts of an entire generation of
philosophers in Europe; by contrast, the Chinese intelligentsia as the agent
of enlightenment encountered an entirely different situation. Their desire for
awakening the public was urgent and much specific due to the international
and domestic situations China faced. And once awakening had been conceived
as consciousness of the relationship between individuals and the country, the
intelligentsia, self-regarded as custodians of the country, felt obliged to super-
vise and to direct the awakening more generally (Fitzgerald 1996).
However, traditional Chinese culture that flattered the intellectuals resulted
in a gap between the intelligentsia and the public. In order to diminish the
gap between themselves and the common people, after the May Fourth Move-
ment, the intelligentsia tried to revise their images that used to be presented as
already-enlightened leaders of new culture, and to accept more circumscribed
role as fellow travelers among the public (Schwarcz 1985). Nevertheless, this
kind of efforts received slight effects, not eliminating the gap but transfer-
ring it to a delicate tension. Therefore, the enlightenment movement was far
from eradicating the roots of traditional culture and old habits of mind at the
time. Hastiness of seeking quick success and instant benefits resulted in disap-
pointment among the intelligentsia. After the establishment of the Nationalist
government, the Chinese intelligentsia split. Some chose to join the govern-
ment as consultants or bureaucrats, some stayed away from politics. China’s
enlightenment movement declined after its climax in the 1920s.
The third strand was the tension among the public in terms of the rise
of the civil society in China. Although the external challenge of modernity
aroused changes in the Chinese societies, these new ideas and knowledge from
the West were only influential in a finite scope. People living in the rural areas
were seldom involved in the enlightenment movement and the construction
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of civil society, which undermined the patterns of the foreign countries that
China learnt from. The peasantry formed the majority of the population but it
seemed that no room left for peasants’ engagement in Chinese modernization.
Moreover, because the urban-rural relationship is as partial reality linking one
part of China with another, it need taking into account how Chinese peasants
appropriated urban elements ranging from consumer goods and modernist ide-
ology and how they responded to and reflected on the urban and the foreign
(Ip et.al. 2003).
Even though in the areas witnessed the debates of the intelligentsia and
experienced enlightenment, Rowe (1993) argues “there was no discursive coun-
terpart in imperial China for civil society, nothing to serve as an articulated
subject of debate the way that theoretical construct, nebulous as it was, did in
Europe. Even in the late Qing/early Republican tide of linguistic borrowing of
the vocabulary of Western social and political thought, no neologism equiva-
lent to civil society seems to have been introduced.” Rankin (1993) stated that
“some institutions and practices characteristic of civil society appeared in the
late 19th century and expanded during the first three decades of the 20th cen-
tury, but a full civil society did not emerge, in part because of the extremely
unfavorable historical context of the 1930s and 1940s. Even if it had been
successfully established, however, the form would have diverged from those in
Western democracies”. With China’s enlightenment, independent social as-
sociations that capable of affecting official policy emerged in the big cities,
(an example is the Citizen Diplomacy Association), although their impact on
policy-making was not always direct or obvious. But weaknesses of the civil
society during the Republic were also recorded: “politics were not defined by
civil society. Legal protections were not strong, individual rights were not a
major focus, topics of political import were aired openly but not debated with
moderated rationality, parliaments were defenseless, and there were no effec-
tive constitutions to limit the coercive and intrusive republican governments
(Rankin 1993: 170-171).”
These three tensions kept throughout the course of China’s modernization,
which impeded the creation of an innovative way that coordinated the challenge
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of modernity with traditional social conditions. The internal friction of the
intelligentsia caused their failure of being a consistent and unified social force to
promote the modern values as well as to coordinate them into Chinese culture.
Even though the KMT replaced the intelligentsia as the leading stratum of
China’s modernization after the 1920s, the gap between the urban and the
rural areas remained a crucial problem. This tension not only hampered social
integration, but also partially caused the weak centralization of the Nationalist
government.
5.3.2 An Unstable and “Top-down” Pattern
In Chapter Four, evaluation of the development of China’s modernization
from the 1920s to the 1940s was given in terms of leadership, establishment
of constitutional institutions, and redistribution of resources. This section
is dedicated to answering why China’s modernization, though with progress
during this period, was still at a low level. These three criteria will be adopted
so as to understand to what extent this progress made sense to the overall
course of China’s modernization.
LEADERSHIP. Besides the external stimulation of China’s modernization,
Rozman (1981: 444) suggests, “foreign factors shaped the course of China’s
modernization more directly”. From his point of view, in the first half of the
20th century, the international context did not so much affect the actual mod-
ernization of China’s economy or other social conditions, such as politics and
the determination of who would lead modernization. Severe threats to national
security and independence resulted in an urgent need of unifying China, and
thus the Nationalists replaced the Chinese intelligentsia as the leading stratum
of modernization in the late 1920s. When the KMT established the Nationalist
government, China’s modernization had begun to follow a relatively consistent
“top-down” pattern. Although the KMT never unified the whole country as a
national government, domestic politics functioned dominantly in the Chinese
society.
Thus, the insufficiency and incompletion of China’s modernization exten-
sively attributed to the KMT’s incapable of coordinating diverse segments of
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the society and various aspects of modernization. Lieberthal (1995: 31-39)
summarizes that internal weaknesses, domestic opponents and foreign adver-
saries distracted the KMT’s attention to China’s modernization.
“Internally, the GMD23 had largely ceased to be an effective party.
The absorption of northern warlords and the purge of left-leaning
cadres stripped the organization of its ideological aplomb...but the
armies in the north, northeast, northwest, and southwest remained
loyal to Chiang’s nominal allies instead of directly to the central gov-
ernment...While Chiang waged almost constant warfare to keep at
bay the various warlords who had nominally joined the GMD, he fo-
cused his primary attention on completing the job that he had begun
in April 1927 – that is, exterminating the communists...Chiang’s con-
centration on the communist threat diverted his attention from the
Japanese challenge that grew and became more ominous during the
late 1920s...Strategic errors, military corruption, and factional in-
fighting eroded the capabilities of the Nationalist forces...The GMD
never successfully transformed itself into a disciplined political party.”
No matter how the course of modernization moves, efficiently or indige-
nously, there is always a need for more centralization. Especially for the
latecomers, coordination and control are matters of urgency from the begin-
ning (Levy 1972). Failing to function as a central government that was strong
enough to control and coordinate social forces to lift external threats, the KMT
was short of capability to promote China’s modernization by implementing the
“top-down” pattern. These problems not only deteriorated KMT’s leadership
in the course of modernization, but also influenced its performance in the
following two aspects.
ESTABLISHMENT OF CONSTITUTIONAL INSTITUTION. The legal
system, which is seen as the hallmark of institution building in the West, was
ignored and circumvented by the Nationalist government. The Provisional
Constitution of 1912 was criticized for its failure of coordinating functions
23Another abbreviation of the KMT (Guomindang).
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among the branches of the government, but in 1923 and in 1946 two more
constitutions were composed, which were praised by legal scholars. However,
none of them was really implemented.
Nathan (1997) considers the administration of the Nationalist government
as a phase of democratic experimentation in China. However, the era of liber-
alism occurred before the Second World War was more because of the weakness
of government repression than because of a firm legal and customary basis for
political freedoms, although these freedoms were listed in Chinese constitu-
tions at the time. As stated before, civil society was not absent in those years,
it was relatively weak as lacked institutionalized protection. Moreover, the
limited-franchise institutions of the Nationalist government failed to function
well. Although in 1947-1948 the Nationalist government held elections for Na-
tional Assembly in those areas it controlled and suffrage was universal, due
to the conditions during the civil war and the KMT’s one-party dominance
of politics, the elections were neither complete nor competitive. Under such
circumstances, the constitutional institutions of the government did not begin
to exercise their constitutional powers.
Moreover, constitutional institutions repeatedly failed due to internal and
external wars. The problem of national security was always perceived as the
core issue to the Chinese throughout the course of modernization. Even not
really involved in wars, the environment was not conducive for building demo-
cratic institutions owing to the tension between the KMT and the CCP. The
KMT increasingly relied on the military as the basis of the Nationalist regime.
Correspondingly, the CCP’s conventional principle, “political power grows out
of the barrel of the gun”, symbolized its emphasis on exclusive control of the
Chinese military machine. The rural areas, which were quite prominent to
accomplish a high degree of institutionalization, were left almost intact by the
KMT. The ill-educated and poverty-stricken peasantry, the majority of the
population, eventually became the reserve forces of the CCP’s rising to power.
REDISTRIBUTION OF RESOURCES. Due to the imperatives of national
salvation, China had to spend as little time as possible keeping up with its
model countries. But it lacked capability of transforming skills and material
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resources into those of the next level. Especially without coordination and
control from a central power, redistribution of resources in the aspects of in-
dustrialization, western-style mass education and social integration were much
restricted under the pressure of lacking convertibility and time (Walder 1979).
It is said in the Cannikin Law that how much water a bucket can contain is
determined by the shortest board, rather than the tallest board. Thus, the
social disintegration was the shortest board of China’s modernization.
This problem seemed solved by the CCP, at least on the surface. Westad
(2003) considers the CCP as a party transformed from a Leninist party, via a
charismatic sect, to a solidly centralist and modernizing national movement,
of which the latter image maximized its support in the late 1940s. In fact,
it was in the 1925-1927 period that the CCP finally became a mass political
party with an internal culture based on Marxism-Leninism and a centralized
organization. It started to replace warlord and local political institutions,
growing to the replacement of China’s dynastic system, providing the essentials
of the country’s political framework. Although this temptation encountered
resistance, the CCP had endured. Its institutions proved anything but stable
(Van de Ven 1991). Nevertheless, the rise of the CCP led to the acceleration
of the conflict between it and the KMT, and furthermore the organization
and legitimation of violence, which on the contrary intensified the instability
of the society. In addition, the more successfully the CCP integrated human
and material resources, the weaker were the centralization of the Nationalist
government. As a result, China’s modernization still stayed in a relatively
preliminary stage, although progressed in the 1940s comparing to its status in
the 1920s.
5.3.3 Implications for Citizen Diplomacy
The three tensions generated when the challenge of modernity confronted
China stayed unsolved throughout the course of modernization, which partially
hindered the Nationalists to develop a highly centralized government to im-
plement its “top-down” pattern of coordination and control. However, to say
that the Nationalist government achieved a weak centralization, I refer to the
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aspects of political administration and institution building. The KMT failed
to exercise central power on unifying the country and on establishing institu-
tional system, and to coordinate and control redistribution of resources. But
it enhanced political control on social activities, if not say coercion or suppres-
sion (Xu and Chen 1996). Public opinion, publishing and press were restricted,
which largely affected the development of the civil society and resulted in the
weaknesses of the civil society during the Republic era as mentioned in 5.3.1.
Consequently, although progress was made from the 1920s to the 1940s,
China failed to achieve a high level of modernization that transformed to hu-
man development, as shown in Table 5.3.3. The public was neither endowed
with civil and political rights, nor freedom of participation into public affairs.
Lacking the rise of mass self-expression values, democratization of diplomacy
in China was rootless. Thus, China’s modernization failed to fulfill the three
conditions concerning the emergence and growth of citizen diplomacy.
Firstly, as stated in Chapter Three, public concerns and demands of con-
ducting citizen diplomacy followed a “stimulation-reaction” model, rather than
spontaneous appeal of mass self-expression. Two factors affected the formu-
lation of this model. One was the enlightenment movement initiated by the
intelligentsia and the civil society simultaneously emerged. The other factor
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was the imperatives of national salvation, which generated a strong sense of
crisis among the public and then prompted mass impulse concerning foreign af-
fairs. These two interrelated factors did contribute to inducing the emergence
of citizen diplomacy and arousing public consciousness of being members of
the national community and disseminated relevant ideas and theories. This
brought about the climax of citizen diplomacy during the 1920s, especially at
the Washington Peace Conference. But as stated in section 5.3.1, once awak-
ening had been defined as an awakening of membership in the country, talk of
citizenship had never veered far from the claims of the state upon the citizen.
Thus, China’s modern awakenings were awakenings of a distinctly Chinese self
that preferred to commune with its nation rather than awakenings to selfhood
and individuality (Fitzgerald 1996). Without the rise of self-expression val-
ues, the public concerns and demands of political participation into diplomacy
stayed as a reaction for stimulation. The basis of citizen diplomacy is fragile.
Second, although warlordism fractionized the society in the 1920s, free
press and public opinion flourished during the period due to the absence of
central restriction. Nevertheless, under the rule of the Nationalist government,
such tend declined (Tang and Zheng 1996). The enlightenment movement was
ended without completing its mission and a full civil society did not emerge.
Moreover, the modest redistribution of resources limited public capability and
opportunities of implementing their concerns and demands to influence the
government’s policy-making in diplomacy. Therefore, the public did not pos-
sess moderate capability and opportunities to conduct citizen diplomacy, which
was reflected on the use of the main instruments: mass movements and public
opinion. On the one hand, although mass movements were launched for certain
purposes, its scope might lost control and its means were likely to be radical.
On the other hand, public opinion tended to pursue immediate effect of nego-
tiations at international conference and to be reluctant to agree on concessions
made by the government, which was contrary to diplomatic principles.
Finally, institutional guarantee for the communication between the public
and the government were absent under the rule of the Nationalist government.
On the public side, it was difficult to achieve consensus in public opinion.
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While lacking representitive institutions for regularing the communication be-
tween the public and the government, the communication became inefficient.
On the governmental side, Eastman (1984) criticizes the Nationalists’ political
structure as it failed to create an effective political administration that would
be sensitive to popular needs and capable of carrying out its proclaimed pro-
grams of political an economic reform. Contrary to its ignorance of the public
and citizen diplomacy, the government’s thought highly of the intelligentsia.
However, this separated citizen diplomacy from its leaders. The intelligentsia
became the representatives of the government instead of the public. This sig-
naled the fundamental changes of citizen diplomacy. Since the late 1930s, the
so-called citizen diplomacy actually had transferred to a kind of “elite diplo-
macy”, no longer keeping its characteristics in the 1920s
Moreover, absence of spontaneous demands of participation into diplomatic
affairs, limitations of capability and opportunities of the public in conducting
citizen diplomacy and the shortage of coordinative guide from the central au-
thority, caused the failure of citizen diplomacy transforming to a stable form
of democratization of diplomacy as “track two” diplomacy in the West.
5.4 Summary
This chapter is devoted to explaining why China’s modernization evolved
inversely to citizen diplomacy from the 1920s to the 1940s. After clarifying
the correlation between modernization and democratization of diplomacy by
generalizing the three conditions of forming a positive relationship between the
two variables, explanation of why a negative relationship happened in China
was given in two steps. Firstly, I accounted for why China’s modernization
achieved relative progress from the 1920s to the 1940s but the absolute gains
were far from a high level of modernization. Secondly, I explained why China’s
modernization failed to entirely fulfill the three conditions of forming a positive
relationship.
Chapter 6
Conclusion
6.1 Summary
The purpose of this thesis has been to answer the two research questions
proposed in Introduction: firstly, what was the relationship between China’s
modernization and the changes in citizen diplomacy from the 1920s to the
1940s? And secondly, why was the relationship between China’s modernization
and the changes in citizen diplomacy in this period negative?
I began by contextualizing the term “modernization” and providing an
overview of China’s modernization in Chapter Two. Then in Chapter Three,
I defined citizen diplomacy in the context provided by the previous chapter.
Also I compared it to other similar conceptions, such as “track two” diplomacy
and public diplomacy, to deepen the understanding of citizen diplomacy. I then
went on to consider how China’s modernization evolved, compared with the
changes in citizen diplomacy from the 1920s and 1940s. In Chapter Four, a
negative relationship between the two variables was presented. I clarified the
correlation of modernization and democratization of diplomacy in Chapter
Five, in order to explain the negative relationship in the Chinese context.
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6.2 Main Findings
• China is categorized as a latecomer of modernization. It consulted the
firstcomers but lacked centralized coordination and control due to the spe-
cific social conditions. The process of China’s modernization commenced
in the late period of the Qing dynasty, and was accompanied by increasing
threats towards its national survival and independence. Until the 1910s,
China’s groping for modernization underwent four stages: strategic awak-
ening; technological learning; reforms of the political regime; and finally
cultural and social enlightenment.
• In the first half of the 20th Century, especifically the Republic era begin-
ning at the end of imperial governance (1911) and terminating as the PRC
was established (1949), China’s modernization simultaneously evolved in
diverse aspects, such as political structure, industrial growth, social inte-
gration and intellectual revolution. As a latecomer, international context
still exerted a certain impact on the course of China’s social transition,
but domestic circumstances dominated to what extent China was mod-
ernized.
• An important phenomenon along with China’s modernization was the
emergence of citizen diplomacy, which was a manifestation of democrati-
zation of diplomacy and featured China’s diplomacy during the first half
of the 20th century. China’s citizen diplomacy is not the equivalent of
“track-two” diplomacy, which functions in the form of people-to-people
communication as defined in most Western literature. Instead, it means
that ordinary citizens supervising, supporting and affecting their own
government’s foreign policies and diplomatic activities by means of pub-
lic opinion and mass movements, so as to achieve the public’s aspirations
and demands for the interests of the country.
• China’s citizen diplomacy was introduced from Japan. However, the Chi-
nese context endowed China’s citizen diplomacy in this period with a
striking feature: the overwhelming emphasis on national salvation. This
was reflected on its main task, which was adjusted as a response to the
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national situation. This “stimulation-action” model was reflected on the
changes of its relationship with governmental diplomacy, the leadership,
and the main instruments.
• With the KMT replacing the intelligentsia as the leading stratum of
China’s modernization, constitutional institutions were gradually estab-
lished and the redistribution of economic, intellectual and social resources
was started. Although the military struggle between the KMT and the
CCP did not end until 1949, the rise of the CCP in the mid 1920s still con-
tributed to the integration of the Chinese society to some extent. Thus,
China’s modernization progressed from the 1920s to the 1940s. In con-
trast, citizen diplomacy achieved great accomplishments at the Washing-
ton Peace Conference in 1922 but underwent fundamental changes under
the rule of the Nationalist government. It was eventually integrated into
governmental diplomacy and lost its essential characteristics from the
1920s. In conclusion, there was a negative relationship between China’s
modernization and the changes in citizen diplomacy.
• The correlation between modernization and democratization of diplomacy
implies that a positive relationship between the two could be formed
only under certain conditions. Three conditions were generalized from
the experience of countries in which a positive relationship was formed:
(1) spontaneous appeals for public participation into diplomatic affairs;
(2) capabilities and opportunities of implementing such concerns and de-
mands; and (3) institutional guarantee of the interaction between the
government and the public in terms of diplomacy. When these three con-
ditions are fulfilled in the course of modernization, democratization of
diplomacy can emerge and grow as modernization progresses.
• Although China’s modernization achieved relative progress from the 1920s
to the 1940s, the absolute gains were far from achieving a high level of
modernization. The KMT failed to resolve the remaining problems re-
sulted from the clash of external challenge of modernity and traditional
Chinese values. Its internal weaknesses, domestic opponents (the CCP)
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and foreign adversaries (Japan) caused the shortage of centralized author-
ity to coordinate and control a “top-down” pattern of modernization. The
public was neither endowed with civil and political rights, nor freedom
of participation into diplomatic affairs. Lacking the rise of mass self-
expression values, democratization of diplomacy in China was rootless.
Consequently, the three conditions of forming a positive relationship were
not fulfilled in China. Citizen diplomacy only obtained a short climax in
the 1920s and then reduced to a shadow of governmental diplomacy.
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